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This paper analyzes the labor markets in the states of Pernambuco, Bahia, Ceará, 
and the Northeast region of Brazil. The findings show a rather heterogeneous impact 
pattern of individual characteristics on monthly wages across the wage distribution.  That 
is, the magnitude of the affect of a wage determinant is different depending on whether 
the worker is placed in the lower, median or top of the wage distribution.  The findings 
reveal that education is key. Basic schooling matters for all four geographical areas and 
across the income distribution.  However, poor workers are awarded lower returns than 
their richer peers and in Bahia and Ceará, the poor do not obtain any returns to basic 
schooling. Furthermore, the impact of 5-8 or 9-11 years of education is larger than that of 
1-4 years of completed education. The returns obtained by a median worker are higher in 
Ceará and Pernambuco than in Bahia. Finally, completed tertiary education offers the 
largest returns of all levels of education; the median worker receives a premium of 105, 
249, and 216 percent in Ceará, Pernambuco, and Bahia, respectively.  Hence, one direct 
policy implication is to increase the quality of education, in particular in poorer 
neighborhoods. 
Experience impacts positively on wages and it is increasing with age until workers 
reach 50 years of age. However, returns to experience are falling significantly across the 
wage distribution.  For the poor and younger generations, experience contributes more to 
wages than education. The occupation of workers is important for wage determination; 
all workers in the included occupational groups are paid more than workers engaged in 
agricultural activities.  Workers employed as technicians or administrators obtain the 
highest returns. The white/non-white wage disparity reveals that white workers are paid 
17 percent more than their non-white co-workers, taking into account other 
characteristics. Gender disparities are large in the Northeast and heterogeneous across the 
wage distribution. The time spent in the current state impacts adversely on wages.  That 
is, those that have stayed earn, on average, less than the newcomers. There are no 
considerable differences between male and female workers. Union membership has a 
positive impact on workers’ wages. 
 3  3
1. Introduction 
 
The Northeast Brazil is home to most of Brazil’s poor people.  It is well known that 
the main determining factors of the level of poverty of a state, region, or country lie in the 
way it uses and remunerates available human resources.  Moreover, the more efficient the 
society is in allocating resources to economic activities, the lower the level of poverty.  
This allocation is mainly taking place in the labor markets, and, therefore, payment is 
highly dependent on the functioning of these markets. In Brazil the two most important 
labor market inefficiencies are:  (1) the economy cannot supply employment to all in the 
active population, thus creating unemployment or underemployment (employment in 
low-quality jobs); and (2) discrimination manifested by under-compensation and under-
utilization of certain groups of employed workers.   
This paper looks at changing ideas on how to analyze the factors behind, and the 
impact of such wages, or more precisely, what determines wages in Northeast Brazil. 
Furthermore, the paper investigates whether there is a difference between low and high-
paid workers.  These questions are analyzed by comparison of the wage determination 
process in four areas:  the Northeast region as a whole, and three individual states, 
namely, Pernambuco, Ceará, and Bahia.  The wage determination model is gauged by 
household data (PNAD) throughout the analysis and the quantile regression methodology 
is applied. This methodology characterizes the distribution of wages in more detail than 
traditional ordinary least squares (OLS) and two stage least squares (2SLS) regressions, 
as it makes it possible to break down the wage determination process across the entire 
wage distribution.  Additionally, workers are allocated in different groups with different 
characteristics.  Wages are compared across workers organized by gender, education, 
race, and geographical location. 
So far, very little research has been done on labor markets in Northeast Brazil and 
even less so at the state level.  Barros and Mendonça (1997) study wages in the Northeast 
and find that the average impact on wages of completed basic education is lower than that 
of secondary and superior education in 1987 and 1990.  Furthermore, the comparison of 
the Northeast to São Paulo reveals that the effect on wages is lower for the second part of 
primary education and higher for the secondary and tertiary in the Northeast.  The 
tendency shows increasing returns over time for secondary and tertiary education.   
Finally, the paper shows that returns are higher for whites than non-whites, controlling 
for education, age, gender, and residence area. 
This paper analyzes for each quantile, each state and for the Northeast region, 
whether the impact of various individual characteristics on wages is homogeneous both 
across the wage distribution in a particular state or region, and across states and regions. 
The findings indicate that wages are by no means determined in the same way across 
states and regions, and for high and low-paid workers.  Moreover, the data sample reveals 
substantial heterogeneity among Nordestinos and, hence, different impacts of the 
explanatory variables exist across the samples and wage distributions.  For example, the 
return to education is far larger in the upper-income quantiles than in the lower ones.  
Furthermore, the findings reveal that large differences also exist across the Northeastern 
states. For example, for the median worker the impact on wages of being employed in the 
formal sector is higher in Pernambuco and Bahia than in Ceará. 4  4
The paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 outlines labor market developments in 
the Northeast region.  Section 3 describes the methodology and data used in this study.  
Section 4 presents descriptive analyses, and Section 5 presents the regression results.  
The last section concludes with a summary of findings. The appendices include the tables 
mentioned in the text, for example, A1 refers to the table 1 in Appendix A.  . 
 
2.  The Northeast Labor Market  
 
In the Northeast of Brazil, the labor market tendencies over the past decade indicate 
that:  first, real wages fell; second, formal employment decreased; third, open 
unemployment increased; and, fourth,  precarious and informal sector employment 
augmented.  In the Northeast, formal employment declined 5.4 percent over the 1990s, 
which is about half of the national average of 10.0 percent (Oliveira and Guimarães Neto 
1999).  According to these authors the total number of lost jobs in the Northeast was 
185,000.  There exists a large degree of heterogeneity with in the Northeast, for example, 
in Pernambuco and Ceará, 10.0 and 1.1 percent, respectively, of the jobs were lost.  The 
number of jobs lost is by far the largest in Pernambuco (72,000), Bahia (54,000) follows 
fairly close and Ceará lost 4,000 positions.  These figures also reveal that the 
Pernambucan economy is far more formalized than other states in the Northeast region.  
Ceará grew faster than Pernambuco in the 90s, which may explain the relative low 
reduction in formal employment in the state. 
In Pernambuco, industries hit the hardest in terms of jobs lost were food and 
beverages including sugar production (45,900 workers lost their jobs in the 1989-94 
period, see Oliveira and Guimarães Neto 1999).  The deregulation and the halt in the use 
of Proálcool as automobile fuel dramatically damaged the sugar industry.  Despite the 
smaller dimensions, Pernambuco experienced a reduction in positions in other industrial 
sectors.  In textiles the job loss (around 9,000), was mainly caused by increased 
competition and a reduction in aliquotas.  Metal sectors were affected less than the 
previous two, but the sector still experienced a 5,300 job cut, mainly attributable to 
deregulation of steel prices, which set in motion a number of firm closings.  In electronics 
and communications, 3,700 jobs were eliminated. 
The reduction in the number of formal jobs did not cause a comparable increase in 
open unemployment in the Northeast as a whole or in the states individually.  Rather the 
decline in formal jobs has set in motion job creation in the informal sector.  The 
indicators for informal job creation show a 7, 1, and 1 percentage point increase in 
Pernambuco, Ceará, and Bahia, respectively, in the first half of the 1999s.  Furthermore, 
in Pernambuco, urban open unemployment fell 28 percentage points in the same period, 
compared to 12 percentage points in Bahia and 0 percentage points in Ceará (Oliveira and 
Guimarães Neto 1999). 
To obtain coverage by the Brazilian labor code, workers need a formal contract or 
signed working card (carteira assinada).  In Brazil, as a whole, as well as in the 
Northeast states, the proportion of workers with a signed working card has fallen 
considerably in the 1990s.  In Pernambuco, around 50 percent of workers had a signed 5  5
card in 1990.  In 1997, the number has dropped substantially and reached 30 percent: 25 
percent for men and 36 percent for women. 
One of the main labor market problems in the Northeast seems not to be the lack of 
job creation—the rate is around 2.5 percent in Recife, 3.0 percent in Fortaleza, and 2.4 
percent in Salvador (Paes de Barros et al. 1999)—but rather the number of poor quality 
jobs that are being created in the states.  These jobs are largely informal in nature and 
characterized by low pay, low productivity, bad working conditions, and high turnover. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
This section is organized in three sub-sections addressing the economic model 
applied in the analysis, quantile regression techniques, and data. 
Economic model 
The underlying economic model used in the analysis will simply follow Mincer’s 
(1974) human capital earnings function extended to control for a number of other 
variables that relate to location.  In particular, we apply a semi-logarithmic framework 
that has the form: 
ln yi = φ(xi, zi) + ui          ( 1 )  
where ln yi is the log of earnings or wages for an individual; i, xi is a measure of a 
number of personal characteristics, including human capital variables, ethnicity, etc.; and 
zi represents location specific variables—for instance, metropolitan living.  The 
functional form is left unspecified in equation (1).  The empirical work makes extensive 
use of dummy variables in order to catch non-linearities in returns to years of schooling, 
tenure, and other quantitative variables.  The last component, ui, is a random disturbance 
term that captures unobserved characteristics. 
Quantile regressions 
Labor market studies usually make use of conditional mean regression estimators, 
such as ordinary least squares.  This technique is subject to criticism because of several, 
usually heroic, assumptions underlying the approach.  One is the assumption of 
homoskedasticity in the distribution of the error terms.  If the sample is not completely 
homogenous, this approach, by forcing the parameters to be the same across the entire 
distribution of individuals may be too restrictive and may hide important information. 
The method applied in this paper is quantile regression.  The idea is that one can 
choose any quantile and thus obtain many different parameter estimates on the same 
variable.  In this manner the entire conditional distribution can be explored.  By testing 
whether coefficients for a given variable across different quantiles are significantly 
different, one implicitly also tests for conditional heteroskedasticity across the wage 
distribution.  This is in particular interesting for developing countries such as Brazil 6  6
where wage disparities are huge and returns to, for example, human capital may vary 
across the distribution. 
The method has many other virtues apart from being robust to heteroskedasticity.  
When the error term is non-normal, for instance, quantile regression estimators may be 
more efficient than least square estimators. Furthermore, since the quantile regression 
objective function is a weighted sum of absolute deviations, one obtains a robust measure 
of location and, as a consequence; the estimated coefficient vector is not sensitive to 
outlier observations on the dependent variable.
2 
The main advantage of quantile regressions is the semi-parametric nature of the 
approach, which relaxes the restrictions on the parameters to be fixed across the entire 
distribution.  Intuitively, quantile regression estimates convey information on wage 
differentials arising from non-observable characteristics among individuals otherwise 
observationally equivalent.  In other words, by using quantile regressions, we can 
determine if individuals that rank in different positions in the conditional distribution 
(i.e., individuals that have higher or lower wages than predicted by observable 
characteristics) receive different premiums to education, tenure, or to other relevant 
observable variables. 
Formally the method, first developed by Koenker and Basset (1978), can be 
formulated as
3 
yi = xi′βθ + uθi = Quantθ(yi | xi) = xi′βθ       ( 2 )  
where Quantθ(yi | xi) denotes the θ
th conditional quantile of y given x, and i denotes an 
index over all individuals, i = 1,…,n. 
In general, the θ
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Buchinsky (1998) examines various estimators for the asymptotic covariance matrix and 
concludes that the design matrix bootstrap performs the best.  In this paper, the standard 
                                                 
 
2 That is, if  0 ˆ > ′ − θ β i i x y , then yi can be increased toward + ∞, or if  0 ˆ < ′ − θ β i i x y , yi can be 
decreased toward -∞, without altering the solution  θ β ˆ . In other words, it is not the magnitude of the 
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This can be seen both as a strength and weakness of the method. To the extent that a given outlier 
represents a feature of “the true” distribution of the population, one would prefer the estimator to be 
sensitive to such an outlier – at least to a certain degree. 
3 See Buchinsky (1998). 7  7
errors are obtained by bootstrapping using 200 repetitions.  This is in line with the 
literature. 
Data 
The analysis in this paper uses micro data from Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de 
Domicilios - PNAD (the Brazilian annual National Household Survey) for 1997.  This 
survey is an annual national household survey performed in the third quarter that 
interviews around 100,000 households every year.  It is conducted by IBGE, the Brazilian 
Census Bureau, and began at national level in 1971 and underwent major revision 
between 1990 and 1992.  The survey contains extensive information on personal 
characteristics, including information on income, labor force participation and 
educational attainment and attendance. 
The wage is spatially deflated to compensate for differences in the average cost-of-
living across the country, according to the spatial price index by Ferreira and Barros 
(1999). 
 
4.  Descriptive Analysis and Background Information 
 
This section presents background information on key variables for wage 
determination used in this study.  The analysis considers different elements contributing 
to the wage determination:  (1) human capital accumulation such as formal education, 
and experience; (2) ethnic background; (3) gender; (4) metropolitan, rural or urban living; 
(5) union membership; and, (6) occupation and sector of employment. 
Wages  
This subsection discusses unconditional wages and wage inequality.  The individuals 
included in the analysis are those who reported that they were employed during the 
interview period and reported the amount earned.
4  The applied wage data is calculated 
on a monthly basis.  Table A1 supplies information on the number of observations and 
distribution of the different groups of variables for the four data samples—the Northeast, 
Bahia, Ceará, and Pernambuco.  The number of observations varies over the samples; for 
example, the sample of workers in each of the three Northeastern states is below 2000. 
The unconditional average monthly wages in Pernambuco is larger than in Bahia, 
Ceará and the Northeast as a whole (table A1 and A2).  This may be due to higher 
average age and accumulated human capital of the sample workers in Pernambuco. The 
average number of years schooling calculated from the data studied are, by and large, in 
line with other data sources; namely, that the average is higher in Pernambuco (5.8 years) 
than in Bahia (5.3 years), Ceará (5.4 years) and in the Northeast region (5.6 years). 
                                                 
4 Individuals that answered yes to question v4705 and reported a monthly prime income, that is, question 
v9532. 8  8
The entire distribution of monthly wages for the four regions is shown in figures 
1A-10A in appendix F.  The plots indicate that the wage distribution follows a similar 
pattern in all four areas.  Furthermore, the variation at each percentile is small (see figure 
1A). In the following, the impact on the wage distribution of individual characteristics is 
discussed. 
The wage distribution of workers belonging to different tenure groups is given in 
figure 2A.  The plot reveals large differences from the median to the top of the 
distribution among tenure groups.  As expected, workers with the highest tenure earn 
significantly more than other tenure groups, not accounting for any other individual 
characteristics as accounted or in the analysis. This is the case for all four areas.  The 
wage dispersion for each percentile above the median is lower in Pernambuco than in 
Ceará and Bahia, indicating that tenure may be less important in the former state in the 
wage determination process than elsewhere.  When comparing the level of earnings for 
each of the four samples, it turns out that workers placed above the 70 percentile in 
Pernambuco with 13 years or more of tenure, earn less than do workers in other states. 
General experience seems to be an important factor in explaining wage differentials 
among workers, when only considering the experience level as the sole wage gap 
explanatory factor (see figure 3A).  In particular, less experienced workers (below 20 
years of age) are clearly being paid less than their older and more experienced peers.  At 
the top of the distribution the wage gap is huge between workers with different 
experience levels. 
Education plays an important role in the wage-setting process in all four regions 
(figure 4A).  In particular, workers who have completed between 9 and 11 years of 
education and more than 12 years of education obtain a substantially higher wage than 
their less educated peers.  The figures show that wages in Ceará for women with more 
than 9 years of completed education clearly exceed those obtained in Pernambuco and 
Bahia. 
Trade-union members are clearly paid more than non-members all across the wage 
distributions.  This finding holds for all samples (figure 5A).  However, the data does not 
take into consideration that this group may also be more educated. 
By occupational sector, the figures reveal that agricultural workers earn far less 
than non-agricultural sector workers.  This finding holds for all states and all along the 
wage distributions (figures 6A-1 and 6A-2).  Surprisingly, there does not seem to be 
much difference between secondary and tertiary sectors in any of the four samples.   
Hence, the earnings in industry and service are at the same level. 
The wage distributions of the gender and racial groups are plotted in figures 9A and 
10A.  A gender gap is very pronounced from around the 20
th percentile and above, and 
favors males.  This finding is homogeneous and of similar magnitude in all the four 
samples.  By racial origin—white versus non-whites—the wage differential is less 
marked in Pernambuco than in other states.  The racial gap is smaller in Pernambuco and 
tends to widen less rapidly across the wage distribution than elsewhere in the region.  
However, it still indicates that racial may be an important explanatory factor in the wage 
determination process. 9  9
Wage inequality 
For 1997, the percentiles for monthly wages are reported in table A3 for different 
groups of workers (union and non-union members, males and females, and whites and 
non-whites).  Additionally, table A3 reports on wage inequality.  The wage inequality 
measured by the 10 percent richest relative to the 10 percent poorest (90/10) is very 
heterogeneous across the four regions—the Northeast, Bahia, Ceará, and Pernambuco.  
The wage inequality ratio 90/10 indicates how much more workers placed in the 90
th 
percentile earn relative to workers placed in the 10
th percentile of the wage distribution.  
The 90/10 ratio of 10 reveals that the richest 10 percent of the workers earn 10 times 
more than the poorest 10 percent, which is the case in the Northeast and Pernambuco.  
The number is slightly higher in Ceará (12.1) and a little lower in Bahia (8.6).  The 99/10 
ratio shows the most variation of the reported ratios.  It is as high as 40 in Ceará, and 24 
and 33 in Bahia and Pernambuco, respectively.  The median worker (50
th) earns around 
300 percent more than the poor workers placed in the 10
th percentile in all the states and 
regions analyzed here.  Furthermore, the 10 percent richest earn 3.6, 3.0, 3.8, and 3.3 
times more than the median worker in the Northeast, Bahia, Ceará, and Pernambuco, 
respectively. 
In Pernambuco and Bahia, the wage inequality, measured by the top of the 
distribution (90
th) and the median (50
th) relative to the 10 percent poorest, is larger among 
males than females and whites than non-whites.  The results are different for Ceará where 
the wage dispersion is larger among women than men.  Table A4 shows that in the 
Northeast education is an important wage-equalizing variable.  The ratio of the 90
th 
percentile to the median falls from 3.5 for workers with non-completed education to 3.1 
for workers with 12 or more years of completed education.  In Bahia, Pernambuco, and 
Ceará, the ratio drops to 2.7, 2.8, and 3.1, respectively.  Furthermore, the 90/50 ratio 
reveals that wages are more unequal in urban than in rural areas. 
Formal education and training 
Table A1 gives the distribution of completed education for workers in the four 
regions.  In 1997, a large share of workers in the sample did not complete any level of 
formal education.  In the Northeast region, 19 percent of the males and 14 percent of the 
females did not complete any level of education.  For the individual states the pictures 
show that 16 percent in Bahia and Pernambuco, and 21 percent in Ceará did not complete 
any level of formal education.  Again, in Pernambuco there are fewer people than 
elsewhere with no completed education.  Thirty-one percent finished between one and 
four years (except 36 percent in Bahia).  Only 9 percent in Ceará and Pernambuco, and 6 
percent in Bahia completed more than 12 years of education.  The data do not indicate 
any large discrepancies in the level of education between female and male workers. 
Furthermore, non-white workers obtained a lower level of education than did white 
co-workers in all four samples.  In the Northeast, the percentage of the population with 
higher education is 7 percentage points higher for whites than for non-whites. 
 
 10  10
5.  Wage Quantile Regression Findings 
 
This section presents findings of the mean and quantile regressions for 1997.  We 





th quantiles.  The same 
wage equation is estimated for each of the four samples:  (1) Pernambuco; (2) Bahia; (3) 
Ceará; and, (4) the Northeast.  Furthermore, we analyze subgroups at different levels of 
education, of different genders, races, and urban-rural living. 
Wages are modeled by using log monthly wages as the dependent variable.  The 
general wage model contains explanatory variables in levels and allows for non-
linearities in the data.  For example, the log wage equation is found to be non-linear in 
education and experience.  This way of modeling wages indicates that returns to 
education and experience are not constant but decreasing over the life cycle.  In addition, 
the model contains dummy variables that take the value of one if, for example, a worker 
holds a job in the formal sector, and zero otherwise.  Such a dummy variable may reveal 
whether there is a wage premium related to the formal sector employment. Appendix C 
presents the estimated wage equations. The median regression specification explains 
between 31 and 35 percent of the variance in wages in the quantile regressions for the 
Northeast, Pernambuco, Bahia, and Ceará, see table D1 that shows the pseudo-R
2.
5  In all 
samples the pseudo-R
2  is rising with the increasing quantile; that is, more is being 
explained in the high-income quantiles than in the low-income quantiles of the wage 
distribution.
6 
In the four samples, all included explanatory variables have the expected signs.  
Very few included variables are not statistically significantly different from zero for all 
quantiles.  Each explanatory variable will now be discussed in turn: (1) education; (2) 
experience; (3) labor market association; (4) occupation and sector; (5)  gender and 
ethnicity; (6) state, metropolitan, rural versus urban living; and, (7) union membership. 
Education 
Human capital has proven to be important in enhancing long-term economic 
growth.
7 A more educated workforce is likely to increase worker productivity, to be 
flexible and innovative, and to facilitate the adoption and use of new technologies.  The 
increasing speed of technological change faced by firms today and international 
economic integration means that workers need to have more skills at higher levels in 
order for firms to be competitive.  One reason for this is that more skilled employees can 
adjust more easily to changes in their firm’s economic and technological environment 
than less skilled workers.
8 Hence, low returns, or the complete lack of returns, are an 
                                                 
5 The standard R
2, which is based on the breakdown of the entire variation between the fitted and residual 
values, is incorrect for quantile regressions.  Therefore, the so-called pseudo-R
2 is used and it is defined as 
the squared correlation between original and fitted observations. 
6 The OLS regressions explain between 53 (Ceará) and 46 (Bahia) percent (see Table D2).  
7 See, for example, Barro (1991) and Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992). 
8 One issue that needs to be mentioned relates to the endogeneity of education in the regressions.  There is 
vast evidence of a positive correlation between earnings and education.  However, social scientists are 11  11
obstacle to economic growth in the Northeast and its states.  Furthermore, findings may 
indicate that large differences in the quality of education across regions within the 
Northeast are important.
9  
Knowledge about educational wage differentials or wage gaps serves at least three 
different purposes.  First, wage differentials reveal the magnitude of incentives or returns 
obtained by workers acquiring education, and, hence, individual educational demand. 
Second, knowing the extent of economic returns to human capital makes it possible to 
access whether it is worth making this kind of investment instead of others.  Third, wage 
differentials disclose how the labor market translates educational inequalities into wage 
inequalities, which is important information in the process of reducing the latter.   
Furthermore, educational returns link to some extent education to labor productivity and 
indicate the magnitude of the contribution of education to economic growth. Therefore, it 
is of interest to estimate the impact of different levels of education and experience on 
money wages.  Furthermore, this analysis may indicate areas of education scarcity and 
hence areas for policy intervention. 
This study confirms the findings of hundreds of other studies, namely that 
education plays an important role in the wage determination process.  Better-educated 
individuals earn higher wages and work in more prestigious jobs than their less-educated 
peers. 
Are returns to education homogeneous across the states and regions and constant 
over income distributions?  According to the findings presented in table C1 and figures 1 
to 4, the answer is no to both questions.
10  In this analysis, findings allow comparison for 
workers with no completed level of education (the reference group) or compared with 
their co-workers who have completed first part of primary school (1-4), second part of 
primary school (5-8), secondary school (9-11), and with those who completed tertiary 
school (12 or more years of education).
11 
In the Northeast of Brazil, I found that returns to 1-4, 5-8, 9-11, and 12 or more 
years of completed education were statistically significantly different from zero and 
positive for all at the analyzed quantiles, controlling for other individual characteristics.  
                                                                                                                                                 
cautious to draw strong inference about the causal effect of education.  In the absence of experimental 
evidence, it is tricky to recognize whether higher earnings observed for better educated employees are 
caused by their higher level of completed education, or whether employees with greater earnings capacity 
have chosen to acquire more education.  Card (1998) surveys the literature on the causal relationship 
between education and earnings and finds that the average marginal returns to education is not much below 
the estimate that emerges from standard human capital earnings function studies.  The PNAD data does not 
supply information which can be used to solve this problem. 
9 Measurement errors in schooling would be expected to lead to a downward bias in the OLS estimator of 
the relationship between schooling and wages, see Griliches (1979). 
10 Unmeasured ability and measurement error problems have been dealt with in the literature applying data 
on twins, see for example Card (1998) and Arias, Hollack, and Sosa (1999). 
11 The so-called “sheepskin effect” states the existence of wage premiums for completing the final year of 
elementary school, high school, or university.  Therefore, it has been argued that credentials such, as a 
school diploma or university degree are more important than years of schooling per se.  That is one reason 
for not having a continuous education variable in the regressions. 12  12
This finding means that having completed at least a few years of education contributes 
more to wages than not having completed any education at all.  Moreover, the premium 
is: first, rapidly increasing with attained education. In the Northeast, a median worker 
experience an impact on wages of 24, 37, 55, and 197 percent for completed 1-4, 5-8, 9-
11, or 12 or more years of education, respectively.
12 Better-educated individuals in the 
Northeast earn dramatically higher wages than do their less-educated counterparts.   
Second, the premium is increasing across quantiles.  That is clearly seen by the following 
example.  A poor worker (10
th quantile) receives a 103 percent return to 12 years or more 
of completed education while a rich worker obtains 252 percent return, both relative to 
those who had not completed any level of education.  Furthermore, this indicates that in 
the determination of returns to education there are other mechanisms at play than pure 
individual characteristics.  One explanation for the difference in returns could be found in 
the quality of education achieved, i.e., that poor attended schools where teaching was of 
lower quality than schools attended by richer people; which the regression analysis does 
not capture.  Another explanation relates to social capital, that is, who you know.  Poor 
people do not benefit to the same degree as richer people from connections, 
recommendations, etc. 
In the following, we look at returns to each level of completed education: 
Basic schooling, having four years or less completed years of education, matters for 
all four geographical areas and across the income distribution except for the poorest in 
Bahia and Ceará (see figure 1).  The poor (10
th quantile) in Bahia and Ceará do not 
receive a wage premium when completing first part of primary education.  One 
explanation may be the low number of observations since for the Northeast as a whole 
findings reveal that four years of completed education generate a return of 16 percent for 
the poorest.  In the Northeast as a whole, the findings reveal a large degree of 
heterogeneity in returns to education across the wage distribution (see table F1 and figure 
1).  Workers in the low end of the wage distribution (10
th and 25
th quantiles) obtain lower 
returns than workers in the top end (75
th and 90
th quantiles).  Hence, workers with the 
same level of education are not compensated equally.  In Pernambuco, a worker at the 
median receives a 43 percent return, and findings reveal that the poor (10
th quantile)) and 
also workers in the 75
th quantile receive the same return to 1-4 years of completed 
education.  But, workers placed in the 10
th, 50
th and 75
th quantile receive statistically 
significant higher returns than co-workers in the top end (90
th quantile) where the returns 
are only 31 percent.  In Bahia and Ceará, no statistically significant wage heterogeneity is 
present for workers with 1-4 years of education, except that the poor do not obtain any 





                                                 
12The percentage return is calculated as (exp(coefficient estimate) – 1) * 100. 13  13
Figure 1 
















Data source: Author’s calculation. 
Second part of primary school also impacts wages significantly in Pernambuco and 
the Northeast region. The returns are larger in Pernambuco than elsewhere, and the poor 
are compensated similarly to the rich.  The returns are higher for 5-8 years of education 
than for 1-4 years of education for all quantiles (see figure 2).  This is also the case in 
Ceará and Bahia. 
Secondary education impacts significantly on the wage distribution in all samples.  
Furthermore, in Pernambuco, Ceará, Bahia and the Northeast returns to secondary 
education (9-11 years) are present at all quantiles.  The returns obtained by a median 
worker are higher in Ceará (84 percent) and Pernambuco (66 percent) than in Bahia (48 
percent) (see figure 3).  In Ceará returns are rapidly increasing across the distribution and 
the poor (10
th quantile) receive a 35 percent return and the rich (90
th quantile) a much 
higher, namely 93 percent return to completed secondary education.  The same is true in 
Bahia.  In Pernambuco, there is less variation across the distribution, and returns are high 
also in the low end of the wage distribution (80 percent) and in the high end returns are 
92 percent. 14  14
Figure 2 














Data source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Figure 3  















Data source: Author’s calculation. 
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For tertiary education (12 years or more of completed education), the findings 
show that the median worker receives a premium of 105, 249, and 216 percent in Ceará, 
Pernambuco, and Bahia, respectively (see figure 4).  The test for equality of returns at 
various quantiles (which is also a test for homogeneity) is presented in Table F1.  The 
findings reveal that workers placed in the 90
th quantile earn significantly higher returns to 
secondary and tertiary education than workers in the 10
th, 50
th and 75
th quantiles.  One 
explanation for the lower returns at lower quantiles may relate to social capital.  It is 
easier to obtain a “good” job when richer, since richer workers generally socialize with 
richer people that have better connections and information than poor people.  Hence, poor 
people do not have the same access to high quality jobs as rich people.  In addition, the 
findings reveal that Pernambuco pays higher returns than Bahia for all levels of education 
and Ceará and Pernambuco alternate for different quantiles and level of education. 
Figure 4  
















Data source: Author’s calculation. 
Gender differences related to education. In the following, the sample is 
disaggregated into two sub-samples:  one for male and one for female workers (see tables 
C2 and C3). Education plays a very important role in determining income for both 
genders.  For all four geographical samples the determinants of income differ 
substantially between the two groups.  The income of male workers increases more 
rapidly than dies income of females with the level of completed education and 
experience.  For instance in the Northeast, a median (50
th) male worker who has 
completed between 9 and 11 years of education (secondary education) obtains returns of 
65 percent while a female worker with the same characteristics only receives a 34 
percent.  The exception being that females with more than 12 years of studies (university 
education) receive a return at least equal to that obtained by their male colleagues.  In the 
Northeast as a whole, encouraging or facilitating females to continue beyond the 11
th year 16  16
of completed education will more than double the impact on wage.  These findings 
suggest that, for all quantiles, university education delinks gender from wages. 
Experience 
There are several reasons for including experience characteristics in the analysis.  
One such reason is that a trained and educated workforce provides flexibility in adapting 
to changes in technology or other economic changes.  Experience and years of schooling 
are widely used in analyses of wage determination (see Welch 1969, Mincer 1974, and 
Levy and Murnane 1992). Two measures of experience are included in this analysis, 
namely general and job-specific experience.  The former is measured by the age of the 
worker and the latter by years of experience on the current job that is tenure. 
Are returns to experience homogeneous across the population and over the life 
cycle? According to the findings presented in table C1, the answer is no to both 
questions. 
General experience.  The reference experience group is workers between 10 and 20 
years old.  The five age groups included in the regression models are 21-30, 31-40, 41-
50, and 51 and above. 
For Pernambuco, Ceará, Bahia and the Northeast region, the experience variables 
are statistically significantly different from zero and positive for all five reported 
quantiles and experience groups, controlling for other individual characteristics.  These 
findings highly indicate that returns to experience are not constant throughout the life 
cycle.  The impact of experience on wages is positive and increases with age until 
workers reach 50 years of age.  Thereafter, the returns fall dramatically at all quantiles 
(table C1).  One explanation may be that older workers adapt less easily to new 
technologies than do younger workers.  Returns to experience are falling significantly 
across the wage distribution in Pernambuco, Ceará, Bahia, and the Northeast.  Hence, the 
experience wage gap is largest at the lower quantiles.  Workers located in the middle of 
the distribution (50
th) and between 21 and 30 years of age receive premia ranging from 21 
percent (Pernambuco) to 38 percent (Ceará) and 40 percent (Bahia).  The variation within 
an age group and across quantiles is huge, and, in particular in Bahia, where the gap 
ranges from 67 percent in the 10
th quantile to 28 percent in the 90
th quantile.  The 
variation in returns across the distribution decreases in all samples with increased 
experience.  For the high age groups (51-70 year olds), the impact of experience on 
wages for a median worker range from 67 percent in Ceará to 56 percent in Bahia and 34 
percent in Pernambuco.  Interestingly, the general experience contributes more to wages 
than education in the younger generations placed in the lower end of the wage 
distribution in Pernambuco, Ceará, and Bahia.  This compares to workers in the higher 
end of the wage distribution where the education impact on wages is by far larger than 
the experience impact. 
Job-specific experience.  The findings for experience or tenure obtained on-the-job 
differ from the findings for general experience (see table C1).  The comparison group in 
this case is workers with less than one year of experience on-the-job.  The four other 
groups included in the analysis are workers with more than 13 years, between 12 and 7, 6 
and 3, and 2 and 1 years of experience in their current job. 17  17
In the Northeast the impact on wages of increased on-the-job experience is 
statistically significantly different from zero and positive. Furthermore, returns are 
monotonically increasing with on-the-job experience.  This is the case in all quantiles in 
the wage distribution.  A median worker in the Northeast receives a 34, 21, 15, and 4 
percent premium for more than 13 years, between 12 and 7, 6 and 3, and 2 and 1 years of 
experience on-the-job, respectively, compared to a worker with less than one year of 
experience.  In Pernambuco and Bahia, the job specific experience variable is 
insignificant for the lowest quantile (10
th).  This indicates that in these states the poor do 
not receive any premium for job-specific experience. 
Workers with more than 13 years, between 12 and 7, and 6 and 3 years of 
experience in their current jobs earn a constant return across the wage distribution, except 
for between 3 and 6 years of experience and in the 10
th quantile in Bahia and in the 90
th 
quantile in Pernambuco, where it is insignificantly different from zero.  The 
Pernambucan worker placed in the 50
th quantile earns for, more than 13 years, between 
12 and 7, and 6 and 3 years of experience 53, 28, and 17 percent more than a co-worker 
with less than a year on-the-job, respectively.  The findings are similar for Bahia, but 
lower for Ceará (24, 28 and 13 percent, respectively). 
Gender differences related to experience. To measure differences between men and 
women in the effect of experience on the determination of wages, I divide the sample into 
two sub-samples:  one for males and one for females (see tables C2 and C3).  The impact 
on wages of medium and high levels of experience (measured both by age and tenure in 
the job) is positive for both men and women, and significantly different from zero for all 
quantiles.  Returns to experience, general as well as on-the-job, are higher for males than 
for females.  Furthermore, returns to general experience increases faster for men than for 
women. 
Labor market association 
Labor market association is measured by the formality of a worker’s job status. 
That is, whether a worker is engaged in the formal or informal sector. Workers with a 
signed working card (carteira assinada) I allocate to be in the formal sector. 
In the Northeast region, workers who held a signed working card obtain statistically 
significant higher pay than their peers without a signed working card (see table C1). This 
finding appears in all four samples. For Pernambuco and Bahia, a median worker with a 
signed working card obtains a 34 percent higher wage premium than a non-signed 
working cardholder.  The premium is generally lower for Ceará where a median worker 
with a signed working card only earns 18 percent more than a worker without a signed 
working card.  For all samples, the premium declines across the wage distribution (see 
figure 5).  That is, low wage earners benefit more in terms of wages from a signed 
working card than do high wage earners.  In the Northeast, a worker placed in the 10
th 
quantile obtains a wage premium of 55 percent whereas a worker in the 90
th quantile only 
receives a 16 percent premium.  These findings indicate that returns to formality in job 
position are not constant across states or across the wage distributions.  The formal sector 
generally supplies higher quality jobs than the informal sector.  Since higher quality may 
require more skills, the signed workbook may capture skill differences between the two 
groups of workers, which the other included variables do not capture.  The wage gap 18  18
between the formal and informal sector may also be caused by lower productivity in the 
informal sector relative to the formal sector, which is not captured by human capital or 
job specific information.  Hence, workers in the informal sector are disadvantaged in at 
least two ways:  first, they do not have access to social security or alike; and second, they 
obtain lower wages, which evidently does not compensate informal workers for the 
absence of social security.  The informal sector workers are not only disfavored in terms 
of wages and social security, but they may also work in an environment where they are 
more exposed to the risk for accidents occurring, etc. 
 
Figure 5  


















Data source: author’s calculation. 
 
Gender differences related to labor market association.  In the Northeast, a worker 
in the lowest income quantile (10
th) experiences an impact on wages of being in the 
formal sector of 68 and 44 percent for male and female, respectively.  Returns are 
significantly different from zero at all quantiles.  Both returns and gender difference are 
falling as income increases.  This also holds in Bahia and Ceará.  In Pernambuco females 
placed in the lowest end of the income distribution (10
th) employed in the formal sector 
obtain a higher premium than their male colleagues. 
 
 19  19
Occupation and Sector 
The occupation of workers is also included in the determination of wages.  Six 
occupation groups are introduced: (1) agriculture and agricultural products; (2) technician 
or administration; (3) transformation industry/manufacturing; (4) transport, 
communication, commerce, or trade; (5) service; and (6) other.  The reference group in 
the analysis is agriculture and agricultural products. 
In the Northeast all the included occupational groups are statistically significant 
and different from zero and positive.  This indicates that workers in the above-mentioned 
occupation groups are paid more than workers engaged in agricultural activities.   
Workers employed as technician or as administrators obtain the highest return (for the 
median worker it is 93 percent), and workers in transport, communication, commerce, or 
trade receive the second highest return (64 percent), controlling for other factors such as 
level of human capital.  Workers in the transformation industry or manufacturing obtain a 
54 percent premium, and in service a 49 percent premium.  Furthermore, the wage gap is 
constant across the distribution for all occupational groups. In Bahia, technicians and 
administrators obtain lower wage premium than colleagues in Pernambuco or Ceará.  For 
the 90
th quantile, the premium is 54, 134 and 243 percent for Bahia, Pernambuco and 
Ceará, respectively.  Hence, regarding occupation there exist substantial regional 
differences in the wage determination process. 
Sector.  The findings reveal that the sector of employment of a worker is important 
in the wage determination process.  The agricultural sector (the primary sector) is 
compared to industry (the secondary sector) and services (the tertiary sector).  Workers 
employed in industry in the Northeast are paid significantly less than their colleagues in 
the agricultural sector (except at the 90
th quantile).  The wage gap is largest at the 50
th 
quantile (18 percent) and lowest at the 10
th quantile (3 percent). 
The picture changes substantially when considering Pernambuco, Ceará, and Bahia 
separately.  Here, there is no measurable difference between wages in the agricultural and 
industrial sectors, controlling for occupation and other individual characteristics.  The 
same holds for the agricultural and service sectors (except for workers placed in the 25
th 
quantile who earn significantly more when employed in the agricultural sector in Bahia 
and Ceará). 
Gender differences related to sector and occupation.  A decomposition of the 
geographical sample into two sub-samples; one for males and one for females (see tables 
C2 and C3), discloses interesting differences with regard to sector of employment.  For 
all geographical areas considered, the sector has no statistically insignificant impact on 
the wages for males.  Conversely, the sector of employment impacts statistically 
significantly on female wages.  In the Northeast, a median female worker in the tertiary 
sector receives 30 percent less than a female worker in the primary (agricultural) sector.  
The sector coefficients show a similar pattern for the individual regions (Pernambuco, 
Bahia, and Ceará), but are rarely statistically significant, which probably is due to the 
lower number of observations compared to the Northeast as a whole. 
  The impact of occupation also differs across gender. In the Northeast as a whole, 
Pernambuco and Ceará, working as a technician or administrator increases wages both 20  20
for males and females.  The coefficient is statistically significant for all quantiles in these 
three areas, except for the 10
th quantile in Pernambuco and Ceará (male and female) and 
in Pernambuco the 25
th quantile for female and 50
th quantile for male.  The female 
premium clearly exceeds the premium obtained by males.  For instance, in the Northeast, 
the median female administrator receives a premium of 142 percent while her male peers 
obtain a 65 percent premium. 
Race and Gender 
Discrimination at an individual level is said to arise if an otherwise identical person 
is treated differently by virtue of that person’s ethnicity or gender, and ethnicity or gender 
by themselves have no direct effect on productivity.  Under perfect competition in the 
capital and labor markets, equivalent employees in equivalent jobs are compensated 
equally, that is, there is no discrimination. 
The estimation of discrimination is difficult.  Worker productivity is seldom 
observed directly, so data must be used to proxy for the relevant productivity 
characteristics.  The main debate occurs over whether relevant omitted characteristics 
differ between ethnicity, and between gender, and whether certain included 
characteristics capture productivity differences or instead are a proxy for ethnicity or 
gender.  The following section reports findings on gender and ethnic differences in data. 
Race.  The quantile regression findings indicate that the racial background of an 
employee is important in Brazil, but less so in the Northeast and the three states (see table 
C1); this is measured by the size of the estimated coefficients on the variable white.  
These findings hold across quantiles, controlling for the level of human capital and other 
worker characteristics. 
The wages of white relative to non-white workers are statistically significantly 
different from zero and positive for all quantiles in the Northeast and the three states, 
except in two cases: the 10
th quantile in Ceará and the 75
th quantile in Bahia (table C1).
13 
Furthermore, the white/non-white wage gap is constant across the distributions (see table 
F1 that presents statistical tests thereof and figure 6).  Differences in wages are hence at 
play in both the upper and lower quantiles in the wage distribution.  This indicates that 
white Brazilians workers generally are paid more than their non-white co-workers.  The 
ethnic wage gap is 17 percent in the Northeast. It is measured at 15 percent in 
Pernambuco, 16 percent in Ceará; and 11 percent in Bahia.  The analysis cannot reveal 
whether the wage disparate is due to discrimination or unmeasured skills, which are not 
included in the analysis.  However, the findings should not be interpreted, as white 
workers are necessarily more productive than others. 
 
                                                 
13 There are very few indigenous people covered by the survey in the Northeast. 21  21
Figure 6  













Data source: Author’s calculation. 
The data set used in this analysis did not include many relevant characteristics 
actually used by employers in their hiring and promotion choices.  Nor is it idle 
speculation to conjecture that difference in family and schooling environments may 
account for any systematic variation in unmeasured characteristics between racial groups. 
Is labor market discrimination by race a first-order problem in the Northeast and 
Brazil?  Undoubtedly, there are employers and employees with discriminatory intentions 
in Brazil and in its states as well as in other countries.  In most countries, the goal of 
achieving economic progress for racial minorities is better served by policies that 
promote skill formation, and not necessarily by strengthening the content and 
enforcement of civil rights laws. 
Gender with regard to ethnicity.  When the sample is divided in two sub-samples—
one for males and one for females—there are no major differences to the above findings 
between the samples.  The white workers are paid more and the premium to race is 
constant across the distribution in Northeast (tables C2 and C3).  In Pernambuco, race 
plays a role in the wage determination process.  In the female sample, returns are 
decreasing across the sample.  Hence, in the low end of the distribution, white women are 
paid 28 percent more than non-whites while in the top; the wage gap is 15 percent.  This 
contrasts the findings for the males where the wage disparity is fairly constant across the 
distribution (around 18 percent). 
Gender.  Are returns to gender homogeneous across the population living in a 
region and across regions?  The regression findings show signs of large measurable 
inequalities between men and women and they suggest that the gender gap is 22  22
heterogeneous across the quantiles but to a less extent heterogeneous across regions 
(table C1). 
Female wages are statistically significantly different from male wages at all 
quantiles, and this holds for all three states and the Northeast region, adjusting for human 
capital and other worker characteristics.  Furthermore, the gender gap is large (see figure 
7).  The Northeast sample reveals that women placed at the median (50
th quantile) are 
paid around 29 percent less than their male colleagues.  Additionally, the wage disparity 
increases with income group.  For the 10
th quantile the gender gap is 29 percent.  It 
increases to 36 and 34 percent for the 75
th and 90
th quantiles, respectively.   The wage 
difference in Pernambuco and Bahia is pretty much in line with the rest of the Northeast.  
In Ceará, the gender wage differentials are larger than in the other Northeastern states.  
Furthermore, the wage differential between rich and poor is huge.  For the rich the gender 
gap is almost double the size of the poor.  Female workers in the 75
th and 90
th quantiles 
are paid 44 and 48 percent less, respectively, than their male peers. 
 
Figure 7 















Data source: Author’s calculation. 
These findings, together with the findings presented in other sub-sections, suggest 
large differences in the wage determination process for men and women.  The gender-
earning gap may to some degree be explained by choice of jobs chosen by women.   
Women are more likely than men to select jobs, which are more flexible in nature.  For 
example, women may choose part time jobs or jobs with lower working hours than men 
as they wish to spend more time minding children and the like.  A second factor that 
influences wages is that, the sector variables included in these regressions are very broad.  
For example, women employed in the service sector work as maids as well as bankers.  23  23
This may influence the gender parameter estimates as relatively more women than men 
will be working in low skill jobs such as the former.  A third explanation may be gender 
differences in unmeasured skills.  The education levels are taken into account, but 
women’s skill levels may be lower than men’s.  Hence, the data reveals that women are 
under capitalized not in terms of education, as they have more completed education than 
males (see table A1), but they may well be in terms of experience.  Additionally, many 
women choose professions where they are less forced to capitalize, for example, they 
work more often in teaching than male peers.  Hence, the data is not able to give a clear-
cut answer as to whether the wage disparity is due to pure discrimination in an economic 
sense or omitted information.  It is very likely that including a larger set of very finely 
separated occupational variables would reduce the size of the estimated gender impacts. 
State, Metropolitan, Rural, and Urban living 
This subsection analyzes wage premia related to three variables on location and 
time lived in a state.  The first variable, urban, quantifies the wage effect of living in 
urban versus rural areas.  The second variable, metropol, measures the impact on wages 
of living in a metropolitan versus a non-metropolitan area.  The third variable, liveten, 
determines the effect of having lived in the state for 10 years or more compared to having 
spent less than 10 years in the current state. 
Urban areas exist because it is an advantage to pursue production and consumption 
activities in a spatially concentrated fashion.  This, combined with the high population 
density, drives up prices of, for example, land.  To compensate for higher prices the 
workers in urban areas require recompense.  Findings show that in the Northeast and the 
three states, workers do receive compensation (table C1).  Urban workers are paid 
statistically significantly more than workers in rural areas, when other characteristics are 
controlled for.  These findings show that there are asymmetries in some areas of Brazil, 
and urban living delinks wages for some quantiles in, for example, Pernambuco. 
The urban-rural wage gap for the Northeast is significantly different from zero for 
three quantiles (the 25
th, 50
th and 90
th) and declining across the wage distribution, 
controlling for other covariates.  In the Northeast, the urban premium is seven percent for 
the median worker.  In the individual states, the urban variable is not statistically 
significantly different from zero.  This is probably due to a combination of factors.  First, 
a low number of observations are available for the three individual states, and, secondly, 
a metropolitan variable is included in the regressions. The expected higher wages in the 
urban area may, therefore, be captured by the metropolitan variable. 
Workers living in the metropolitan areas in the Northeast, Bahia, Ceará, and 
Pernambuco are compensated in the form of a significant and positive wage premium at 
all quantiles.  Hence, metropolitan living is more important in the wage determination 
than living in an urban area.  The metropolitan variable estimates reveal that the wage 
premium differs across the wage distribution and samples.  The median worker receives a 
38 percent premium in the Northeast.  This finding is constant across the distribution.  In 
Pernambuco, Ceará, and Bahia, the compensation is 40, 47, and 44 percent, respectively, 
and heavily decreasing across the wage distribution.  The difference in wages, which can 
be attributed to location, may capture more, for example, unmeasured skills than the 
difference in the cost of living in the urban and rural areas. 24  24
Gender differences related to Metropolitan living.  Splitting up the sample into two 
sub-groups, one for male and one for female, reveals that gender impacts the wage 
determination process also with regarding to habitation.  Females in metropolitan areas 
obtain a substantial higher wage premium, almost the double, than their male co-workers 
in metropolitan areas.  This is the case for all samples.  The habitation contributes 51, 46, 
56, and 65 percent for the median female in the Northeast, Pernambuco, Bahia and Ceará, 
respectively, while males obtain 28, 33, 29, and 36 percent, respectively. 
The time spent in the current state proves statistically significant in the wage 
determination process for the Northeast as a whole, Pernambuco and Ceará.  Having 
spent more than 10 years in the same state impacts adversely on wages.  That is, those 
that have stayed earn, on average, less than the newcomers.  For a median worker in the 
Northeast, the impact of having lived more than 10 years in a state implies a 9 percent 
decrease in the wage.  Furthermore, the magnitude is not constant across samples.  For 
Pernambuco and Ceará, the time-in-state wage gap is larger; namely 17 and 20 percent, 
respectively, for the 90
th quantile.  For Bahia, the time spent in the state has no influence 
on the wage obtained, except for the 50
th quantile where the time spent in the state is 
marginally significant and negative (8 percent).  There are no considerable differences 
between male and female workers (tables C2 and C3).  This negative gap is rather 
puzzling.  One explanation may be that many educated and skilled workers left the region 
to move to the South expecting a higher wage premium and higher returns to their skills, 
leaving behind, as a consequence, their less-skilled and less-educated peers in, for 
example, Pernambuco.  The newcomers to the Northeastern states may, therefore, on 
average be more skilled (of a kind not included in the analysis) and that could explain the 
wage difference.  Also, the return of Nordestinos who moved to the South and obtained 
new skills that now return to the region could be another explanatory factor.  Further 
analysis is needed to uncover the whole migration story behind the above findings. 
Union membership 
Union membership has an important impact on workers’ wages.  Trade union 
membership appears statistically significant and positive in all four samples, even when 
all the above-mentioned factors are taken into account. 
For the Northeast as a whole, a union member in the low end of the wage 
distribution obtains a higher premium than a worker at the top.  A worker placed in the 
10
th and 90
th quantiles receives a 24 and 17 percent premium, respectively.  Hence, 
returns are not constant but rather falling across the wage distribution. 
In Pernambuco, union members are benefiting relative to non-union members in 
the wage process (except in the 90
th quantile, where union membership impact wages 
insignificantly).  The return to union membership is around 18 percent and constant 
across the distribution.  For Ceará and Bahia, the union wage gap is declining across the 
distribution and the median worker obtains 22 and 3 percent premia, respectively. 
These findings are very much in line with the premium that European labor markets 
pay union members.  For the poorest region in Brazil, these results are surprising due to 
high levels of underemployment and unemployment.  The findings are different from 
other studies on developing countries and unions where the wage differential between 25  25
members and non-union members often are negative, for example, in Africa or 
insignificant as in Mexico.
14  
In the theoretical literature on unions, it has long been recognized that unions may 
influence factors other than wages, such as security in employment (tenure). 
Hence, union members are favored in terms of wages by the unions, given 
measured characteristics.  It could be due to more successful bargaining over firm rents 
by this group of workers or insider power.  Another explanation could be missing non-
observable characteristics in the analysis; for example, union members could have an 
exceptionally high motivation and are reliable or have unmeasured skills, which are 
captured by the union variable.  If the union wage gap is indeed truly caused by unions, it 
may indicate lack of social awareness among the union members since this will secure 
neither the Pernambucan nor other Northeast states’ competitiveness and their own future 
employment in a world of rapid technological change. 
Gender differences related to union membership.  Estimating the wage determination 




6.  Conclusion 
 
The mean and quantile wage regression analyses for Pernambuco, Bahia, Ceará and 
the Northeast region as a whole for 1997 show a rather heterogeneous impact pattern of 
individual characteristics on monthly wages.  This is also the case across the wage 
distribution, that is, the magnitude of the affect of a wage determinant is different 
depending on the worker being rich, poor or placed in the median of the wage 
distribution.  In the following each of the wage determinants are discussed in turn. 
Basic schooling matters for all four geographical areas and across the income 
distribution.  However, poor workers are awarded lower returns than their rich peers.  A 
striking finding shows that in Bahia and Ceará, the poor do not obtain any returns to basic 
schooling. Completed second part of primary school impacts wages significantly in the 
Northeast.  The returns are larger in Pernambuco than elsewhere, and the poor are 
compensated similarly to the rich.  Furthermore, the impact of 5-8 years of education is 
larger than of 1-4 years of completed education.  Also, completed secondary education 
affects significantly wages in all samples.  The returns obtained by a median worker are 
higher in Ceará and Pernambuco than in Bahia.  In Ceará the returns are rapidly 
increasing across the distribution, and the poor people receive a 35 percent return and the 
rich a much higher, namely 93 percent return to completed secondary education.  The 
same is true in Bahia.  In Pernambuco, there is less variation across the distribution.  
Finally, completed tertiary education offers the largest returns of all levels of education; 
                                                 
14 See Maloney and Ribeiro (1999) on Mexico and Rama (1998), Verner (1999a), and Kristensen and 
Verner (2000) on Africa. 26  26
the median worker receives a premium of 105, 249, and 216 percent in Ceará, 
Pernambuco, and Bahia, respectively. 
Explanations for the lower returns that the poor obtain may relate to quality of 
supplied education and lack of social capital.  Labor market capital is more abundant for 
richer workers.  It is easier to obtain a “good” job when richer, since richer workers 
generally socialize with people that have connections, information and power.  Hence, 
poor people do not have the same access to well paid jobs as rich people.  The findings 
reveal that Pernambuco pays higher returns than Bahia for all levels of education and 
Ceará and Pernambuco alternate for different quantiles and levels of education.  Hence, 
one direct policy implication is to increase the quality of education, in particular, in 
poorer neighborhoods.  Additionally, launching of mentoring programs where well-
heeled workers help less well off peers could aid and reduce the labor market capital 
disparities.  These findings indicate that education tends to reduce the risk of poverty.  
The less education you have, the more likely it is that you move into poverty (also see 
Verner 2000). 
General experience impacts positively on wages and it is increasing with age until 
workers reach 50 years of age. Returns to experience are falling significantly across the 
wage distribution.  Hence, the poor experience a larger wage gap than richer workers. For 
the poor and younger generations, experience contributes more to wages than education.  
However, for workers in high end of the wage distribution, the educational impact is by 
far larger than the experience impact.  Job-specific experience or tenure affects wages 
positively and returns are monotonically increasing with experience. 
Labor market association is measured by the formality of one’s job status. For 
Pernambuco and Bahia, a median worker with a signed working card obtains a 34 percent 
higher wage premium than a non-signed working cardholder and the premium declines 
across the wage distribution.  That is, low-wage earners benefit more in term of wages 
from formal sector employment than high wage earners.  Higher-quality jobs may require 
more skills; hence the signed workbook factor may partly capture unmeasured skills.  The 
wage gap may also be caused by lower productivity in the informal sector compared to 
the formal sector, which is not picked up by education and other human capital or job 
specific information.  Hence, workers in the informal sector are disadvantaged in at least 
two ways: first, they are less protected and second, they obtain lower wages, which 
evidently does not compensate informal workers for the absence of the protection which 
goes along formal sector work. 
Sector of employment of a worker is included in the analysis and the agricultural 
sector is compared to industry and services and no measurable differences are revealed.  
The occupation of workers is important for wage determination; all workers in the 
included occupational groups are paid more than workers engaged in agricultural 
activities.  Workers employed as technicians or administrators obtain the highest returns.  
Furthermore, the wage gap is constant across the distribution for all occupational groups. 
The white/non-white wage disparity is significant for both the poor and rich 
workers. White workers are paid 17 percent more than their non-white co-workers, taking 
into account human capital, etc. 27  27
Gender  disparities are large in the Northeast and heterogeneous across the 
quantiles.  For the poor the gender gap is 29 percent and it increases to 34 percent for the 
rich.  In Ceará, the gender wage differentials are larger than in the other Northeastern 
states.  Furthermore, the income of male workers increases more rapidly than income of 
females with the level of completed education and experience.  Moreover, the returns to 
experience, in general as well as on-the-job, are higher for males than for females. 
Urban area workers are compensated at higher prices.  The urban-rural wage gap 
for the Northeast is 7 percent for the median worker and declining across the distribution.  
Workers living in the metropolitan areas are compensated in the form of a positive wage 
premium at all quantiles and metropolitan living is more important in the wage 
determination than living in an urban area. 
The time spent in the current state impacts adversely on wages.  That is, those that 
have stayed earn, on average, less than the newcomers. There are no considerable 
differences between male and female workers. 
Union membership has an important impact on workers’ wages. For the Northeast 
as a whole, a union member in the low end of the wage distribution obtains a higher 
premium than a peer at the top.  A worker placed in the 10
th and 90
th quantiles receives a 
24 and 17 percent premium, respectively. 
The analysis shows that education has an important effect on wages and, therefore, 
on well being in the Northeast and the three states.  The findings show the importance of 
improving the quality of obtained education, in particular, that of primary education.  It is 
important to reduce dropout rates, so that more children continue and complete their 
secondary education.  One direct action plan for the government would be to work with 
the private sector in order to expand the Bolsa de Escola program to the entire region and, 
furthermore, supply education credits so more children can complete secondary 
education. 
One observation, which appears from this study, is a lack of skills.  The reason may 
be that, in general, investing in training is risky for a firm, since the return is unclear, as 
the human capital obtained is not fixed in the firm.  The trained workers own their brains, 
and can leave with the human capital and work in another firm.  High labor turnover (47 
percent) in Brazil increases this risk (see Gonzaga (1996)), resulting in too little 
investment in training by firms.  The state can assist in the process of moving from a low-
training equilibrium to a higher equilibrium with better jobs and more skills.  Policy 
makers can facilitate the access to training for workers--both with and without a working 
card, in collaboration with the private sector.  This would also increase the 
competitiveness of the workers when they have to compete with workers in other states 
and countries.  In a world of increased globalization, job-saving technologies are widely 
being applied.  
References 
 
Arias, O., K.F. Hollack, and W. Sosa (1999). “Individual Heterogeneity in the Returns to 
Schooling:  Instrumental Variables Quantile Regression Using Twins Data,” Mimeo, 
university of Illinois 
Barro, R.J. (1991) “Economic Growth in a Cross Section of Countries”, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, Vol. 106, No. 2. 
Barros Paes de, R., S. Firpo, P. Leite, M. Bahia, and R. Barrete (1999) “Identificado do 
padres espaciais do processo de criação, destruição e realocação do emprego no 
Brasil” IPEA. 
Barros R. and R. Mendonça (1997) “A Educação e o Processo de Determinação dos 
Salários no Nordeste Brasileiro”, IPEA. 
Buchinsky, M. (1998).  “Recent Advances in Quantile Regression Models – A Practical 
Guideline for Empirical Research", The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. XXXIII, 
No. 1, pp. 88-126. 
Card, D. (1998) “The Causal Effect of Education on Earnings”, forthcoming in 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Vol. 3, Ashenfelter, O. and Card, D. (eds.) 
Deaton, A. (1997) “The Analysis of household Surveys – A Microeconometric Approach 
to Development Policy”, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. 
Ferreira, F. and R. Paes de Barros (1999) 
Gonzaga, M. G. (1996) “The Effect of Openness on Industrial Employment in Brazil”  
IPEA, Serie Seminarios No 27/96. 
Juhn, C., K.M. Murphy, and Pierce, B. (1993) “Wage Inequality and the Rise in Returns 
to Skills”, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 101, No. 3. 
Koenker, R. and Basset, G. Jr. (1978) “Regression Quantiles”, Econometrica, Vol. 46, 
No. 1, pp. 33-50. 
Koenker and D’Orey (1993) “Computing Regression Quantiles”, Applied Statistics, 36, 
pp. 383-393, and 43, pp. 410-414. 
Koenker, R. and Portnoy (1997) “Quantile Regression”, Office of Research Working 
Paper, No. 97-0100, College of Commerce and Business Administration, University 
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 
Kristensen, N. and D. Verner, (2000) “Labor Market Distortions in Côte d’Ivoire: A 
Quantile Regression Analysis on Employer-Employee Data”, Mimeo, The World 
Bank, Washington, DC. 
Levey, F. and R. J. Murnane, (1992) “U.S. Earnings Levels and Earnings Inequality: A 
Review of Recent Trends and Proposed Explanations”, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Vol. 30, pp. 1333-1381. 29  29
Maloney, W. F. and Ribeiro, E.P. (1999) “Efficiency Wage and Union Effects in Labor 
Demand and Wage Structure in Mexico: An Application of Quantile Analysis”, 
Working Paper, The World Bank. 
Mankiw, N.G., Romer, D., and Weil, D.N. (1992) “A Contribution to the Empirics of 
Economic Growth, Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 107, No. 2.” 
Mincer, J. (1974) “Schooling, Experience and Earnings”, NBER Working Paper, New 
York. 
Oliveira C. W. de Albuquerque and L. Guimarães Neto (1999) “Emprego Organizado e 
Regiões Nos Anos 90: Quem Perdeu Mais?” Memio. 
Rama, M. (1998).  “Wage Misalignment in CFA Countries:  Are Labor Market Policies 
to Blame?”, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 1873, The World Bank,  
Washington DC. 
Verner, D. (1999a) “Are Wages and productivity in Zimbabwe Affected by Human 
Capital Investment and International trade?”, Policy Research Working Paper, No. 
2101, The World Bank, Washington, DC.  
Verner (1999b) “The Macro Wage-curve in Zimbabwe”, Policy Research Working Paper, 
No. 2052, The World Bank, Washington, DC. 
Verner, D. (1999c) “Wage and Productivity Gaps: Evidence from Ghana”, Policy 
Research Working Paper, No. 2168, The World Bank, Washington, DC.  
Verner, D. (2000) “The Dynamics of Poverty and its Determinants: The Case of 





Wage determination in 
Pernambuco, Bahia, Ceará amd the Northeast: 






Appendix A:  Summary Statistics 
Appendix B:  Definition of Variables 
Appendix C:  Quantile Regression Findings 
Appendix D:  R? for Quantile Regression and OLS Regressions 
Appendix F:  ? 
 31  31
 
 
Appendix A.          TABLE A1-BRAZIL. BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
all union  nonunion  males  females  white  non-white  variable 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 32  32
 
Appendix A.          TABLE A1-NORTH-EAST. BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
all union  nonunion  males  females  white  non-white  variable 
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Appendix A.          TABLE A1-BAHIA. BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
all union  nonunion  males  females  white  non-white  variable 
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Appendix A.          TABLE A1-PERNAMBUCO. BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
all union  nonunion  males  females  white  non-white  variable 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 35  35
 
Appendix A.          TABLE A1-CEARA. BASIC DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
all union  nonunion  males  females  white  non-white  variable 

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix A.          TABLE A2. MEAN AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS 
Brazil North-East Bahia  Pernambuco  Ceara  variable 
















































Appendix A.          TABLE A3-BRAZIL. PERCENTILES AND RATIO’S OF PERCENTILES FOR MONTHLY WAGES 
percentiles and 
ratio’s 
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Appendix A.          TABLE A3-NORTH-EAST. PERCENTILES AND RATIO’S OF PERCENTILES FOR MONTHLY WAGES 
percentiles and 
ratio’s 



































































































Appendix A.          TABLE A3_BAHIA. PERCENTILES AND RATIO’S OF PERCENTILES FOR MONTHLY WAGES 
percentiles and 
ratio’s 
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Appendix A.          TABLE A3-PERNAMBUCO. PERCENTILES AND RATIO’S OF PERCENTILES FOR MONTHLY WAGES 
percentiles and 
ratio’s 


































































































Appendix A.          TABLE A3-CEARA. PERCENTILES AND RATIO’S OF PERCENTILES FOR MONTHLY WAGES 
percentiles and 
ratio’s 
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Appendix A.          TABLE A4. SOME MORE PERCENTILES AND RATIO’S OF 
PERCENTILES 
Brazil  stud0  stud1_4  stud5_8  stud9_11  stud12pl  rural  urban 
10th  99.478 97.268 83.474 77.372 77.515 46.954  106.583 
50th  290.682 309.488 276.329 239.986 232.546 135.644 290.682 
90th  1182.686 1326.377 1326.377 1105.314  775.152  449.590 1215.846 
99th  4421.257 4650.911 4642.320 4421.257 2441.728 2086.838 4421.257 
50/10  2.922 3.182 3.310 3.102 3.000 2.889 2.727 
90/10  11.889 13.636 15.890 14.286 10.000  9.575 11.407 
99/10  44.444 47.816 55.614 57.143 31.500 44.444 41.482 
90/50  4.069 4.286 4.800 4.606 3.333 3.314 4.183 
99/50  15.210 15.028 16.800 18.423 10.500 15.385 15.210 
99/90  3.738 3.506 3.500 4.000 3.150 4.642 3.636 
NE  stud0  stud1_4  stud5_8  stud9_11  stud12pl  rural  urban 
10th  116.273  115.616 96.894 96.894  104.342 43.394  116.273 
50th  331.594 331.594 309.488 289.041 289.041 157.253 331.594 
90th  1162.728  1259.622  1162.728 994.783 884.251 472.069  1105.314 
99th  3853.879 3853.879 3853.879 3372.144 2210.629 2712.116 3391.289 
50/10  2.852 2.868 3.194 2.983 2.770 3.624 2.852 
90/10  10.000 10.895 12.000 10.267  8.475 10.879  9.506 
99/10  33.145 33.333 39.774 34.802 21.186 62.500 29.167 
90/50  3.506 3.799 3.757 3.442 3.059 3.002 3.333 
99/50  11.622 11.622 12.452 11.667  7.648 17.247 10.227 
99/90  3.315 3.060 3.315 3.390 2.500 5.745 3.068 
Bahia  stud0  stud1_4  stud5_8  stud9_11  stud12pl  rural  urban 
10th  128.869 116.273 116.273 115.616 116.273  78.678 116.273 
50th  339.783 337.214 331.594 331.594 331.594 195.272 337.214 
90th  1105.314  1215.846  1105.314 934.566 884.251 505.788  1105.314 
99th  2890.409 3315.943 3372.144 2809.925 2210.629 1123.974 2763.286 
50/10  2.637 2.900 2.852 2.868 2.852 2.482 2.900 
90/10  8.577  10.457 9.506 8.083 7.605 6.429 9.506 
99/10  22.429 28.519 29.002 24.304 19.012 14.286 23.766 
90/50  3.253 3.606 3.333 2.818 2.667 2.590 3.278 
99/50  8.507 9.833  10.169 8.474 6.667 5.756 8.194 
99/90  2.615 2.727 3.051 3.007 2.500 2.222 2.500 
Pernambuco  stud0  stud1_4  stud5_8  stud9_11  stud12pl  rural  urban 
10th  125.210 116.273 110.531 110.531 114.776  57.315 116.273 
50th  364.754 353.701 331.594 314.905 313.026 156.513 348.818 
90th  1162.728 1326.377 1156.164 1105.314  884.251  460.830 1105.314 
99th  4360.229 4421.257 4421.257 3853.879 2210.629 2820.601 4360.229 
50/10  2.913 3.042 3.000 2.849 2.727 2.731 3.000 
90/10  9.286 11.407 10.460 10.000  7.704  8.040  9.506 
99/10  34.823 38.025 40.000 34.867 19.260 49.212 37.500 
90/50  3.188 3.750 3.487 3.510 2.825 2.944 3.169 
99/50  11.954 12.500 13.333 12.238  7.062 18.022 12.500 
99/90  3.750 3.333 3.824 3.487 2.500 6.121 3.945 
Ceara  stud0  stud1_4  stud5_8  stud9_11  stud12pl  rural  urban 
10th  116.273 88.425 81.387 83.474 84.916 26.085  116.273 
50th  340.437 331.594 290.682 290.682 287.382 134.877 331.594 40  40
90th  1326.377 1326.377 1252.511 1059.817  884.251  521.709 1215.846 
99th  4166.440 4166.440 4421.257 3853.879 2422.349 2608.547 3853.879 
50/10  2.928 3.750 3.572 3.482 3.384 5.171 2.852 
90/10  11.407 15.000 15.390 12.696 10.413 20.000 10.457 
99/10  35.833 47.118 54.324 46.169 28.526  100.000 33.145 
90/50  3.896 4.000 4.309 3.646 3.077 3.868 3.667 
99/50  12.239 12.565 15.210 13.258  8.429 19.340 11.622 
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Identifier, control number 
identifier, serial number 
dummy=1 if female and zero if male, from v0302 
from v8005 
size of family from v0403 
from v0404 
geographical region from v5030 
lived in other state? yes=1, from v0504 
lived in this state for 5-9 years, from v5063 
lived in this state for at least ten years, from v5065 
self-assessed read and write ability (not arith.), from v0601 
highest level of education attended in the past, from v0607 
yes/no to the previous question v0607, from v0608 
worked in reference week yes/no? (incl. self-empl, from v9001) 
metropolitan area or not, from v4727 
urban rural dummy, from v4728 
monthly income from primary/principle source, from v9532 
union member yes/no?, from v9087 
monthly income from additional source, from v9982 
education level reached, from v4701 
years spend in school, from v4703 
occupational category, from v4706 
agriculture dummy, from v4708 
sector or industry, from v4709 
occupational group 
total individual income, from v4720 
total household income, from v4721 
family characteristics/#children, from v4723 
yrs of school (yrs grouped), from v4738 
ln(income) 
tenure, calculated using v9611 and v9612 
dummy=1 if tenure is less than 6 months 
dummy=1 if tenure is 1-2 years 
dummy=1 if tenure is 3-6 years 
dummy=1 if tenure is 7-12 years 
dummy=1 if tenure is 13 years and plus 
tenure squared 
dummy=1 if age between 10-20 years 
dummy=1 if age between 21-30 years 
dummy=1 if age between 31-40 years 
dummy=1 if age between 41-50 years 
dummy=1 if age between 51-70 years 
age squared  
dummy=1 if race is white and zero otherwise  
dummy=1 if zero years of study 
dummy=1 if 1-4 years of study 
dummy=1 if 5-8 years of study 
dummy=1 if 9-11 years of study 
dummy=1 if 12 or more (plus) years of study 
dummy=1 if sector=agricultural, v4709 
dummy=1 if sector=manufacturing, v4709 
dummy=1 if sector=construction, v4709 
dummy=1 if sector=other industry, v4709 
dummy=1 if sector=transport/communication or trade/commerce, v4709 
dummy=1 if sector=service (incl. financial services), v4709 
dummy=1 if sector=social, v4709 
dummy=1 if sector=public, v4709 
dummy=1 if sector=NA or other 
dummy=1 if sector=primary sector (identical to agriculture (i.e.=agric)) 
dummy=1 if sector=secondary sector (identical to manufact+construct+otherin) 
dummy=1 if sector= tertiary sector (id. to tracom+service+social+public)  
dummy=1 if occupation=agriculture and agricultural  products 
dummy=1 if occupation=technician or administration 
dummy=1 if occupation=transformation industry/ manufacturing 
dummy=1 if occupation=transport/communication/commerce/trade 
dummy=1 if occupation=service dummy=1 if occupation=NA/other 
dummy=1 if married and zero otherwise, from 4723 
dummy=1 for child family and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if northern region and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if north-eastern region and zero otherwise 
dummy=1 if south-eastern region and zero otherwise43  43
 
Appendix C1.  Quantile regressions including all individuals 
NE, all  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef. P>|t|
  Q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
female -0.343 0.000 -0.358 0.000 -0.409 0.000 -0.452 0.000 -0.414 0.000
white 0.117 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.178 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.162 0.000
union 0.214 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.144 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.154 0.001
urban 0.100 0.166 0.087 0.066 0.064 0.063 0.058 0.192 0.067 0.079
metropol 0.319 0.000 0.320 0.000 0.324 0.000 0.270 0.000 0.209 0.000
liveten -0.111 0.004 -0.096 0.000 -0.091 0.000 -0.112 0.000 -0.077 0.014
age21_30 0.352 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.277 0.000 0.324 0.000 0.264 0.000
age31_40 0.468 0.000 0.433 0.000 0.480 0.000 0.547 0.000 0.502 0.000
age41_50 0.551 0.000 0.540 0.000 0.554 0.000 0.617 0.000 0.517 0.000
age51_70 0.445 0.000 0.397 0.000 0.399 0.000 0.519 0.000 0.481 0.000
tenu1_2 0.104 0.030 0.055 0.075 0.039 0.142 0.000 0.991 0.028 0.528
tenu3_6 0.174 0.002 0.143 0.000 0.140 0.000 0.147 0.000 0.163 0.001
tenu7_12 0.236 0.000 0.203 0.000 0.190 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.231 0.000
tenu13p 0.258 0.000 0.248 0.000 0.289 0.000 0.335 0.000 0.469 0.000
stud1_4 0.146 0.011 0.159 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.208 0.000 0.237 0.000
stud5_8 0.300 0.000 0.254 0.000 0.313 0.000 0.337 0.000 0.384 0.000
stud9_11 0.412 0.000 0.304 0.000 0.440 0.000 0.544 0.000 0.619 0.000
stud12pl 0.708 0.000 0.808 0.000 1.090 0.000 1.127 0.000 1.261 0.000
secsec 0.059 0.603 -0.043 0.643 -0.073 0.250 0.025 0.695 0.159 0.033
tertsec -0.152 0.159 -0.197 0.028 -0.200 0.001 -0.134 0.026 0.025 0.709
techadm 0.496 0.000 0.615 0.000 0.657 0.000 0.670 0.000 0.663 0.000
transfor 0.290 0.032 0.377 0.000 0.431 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.358 0.000
octracom 0.346 0.011 0.455 0.000 0.492 0.000 0.490 0.000 0.428 0.000
ocservic 0.321 0.019 0.385 0.000 0.398 0.000 0.447 0.000 0.333 0.000
NAoccup 0.194 0.146 0.210 0.037 0.259 0.000 0.251 0.000 0.186 0.015
carteira 0.438 0.000 0.366 0.000 0.288 0.000 0.218 0.000 0.146 0.000
_cons 3.522 0.000 3.987 0.000 4.335 0.000 4.667 0.000 4.948 0.000
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Appendix C1.  continued 
Pernamb,  all  Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| 
  q10 q25 q50 q75 q90 
female -0.274 0.001 -0.305 0.000 -0.374 0.000 -0.385 0.000 -0.415 0.000
white 0.194 0.006 0.201 0.000 0.129 0.007 0.121 0.058 0.167 0.039
union 0.215 0.017 0.157 0.040 0.140 0.034 0.163 0.047 0.146 0.164
urban -0.137 0.413 -0.012 0.918 0.093 0.434 0.095 0.407 0.075 0.571
metropol 0.407 0.000 0.393 0.000 0.338 0.000 0.253 0.000 0.272 0.000
liveten -0.164 0.029 -0.092 0.077 -0.094 0.079 -0.185 0.007 -0.191 0.035
age21_30 0.344 0.006 0.257 0.004 0.192 0.055 0.206 0.051 0.296 0.012
age31_40 0.370 0.007 0.466 0.000 0.413 0.000 0.462 0.000 0.465 0.000
age41_50 0.570 0.000 0.534 0.000 0.569 0.000 0.642 0.000 0.602 0.000
age51_70 0.580 0.000 0.387 0.001 0.289 0.026 0.491 0.000 0.487 0.000
tenu1_2 0.049 0.716 0.044 0.604 0.026 0.754 -0.029 0.785 0.011 0.924
tenu3_6 0.182 0.177 0.116 0.219 0.158 0.064 0.133 0.209 0.122 0.315
tenu7_12 0.202 0.205 0.204 0.051 0.245 0.027 0.199 0.105 0.268 0.040
tenu13p 0.178 0.479 0.204 0.198 0.425 0.001 0.251 0.081 0.204 0.220
stud1_4 0.358 0.010 0.135 0.160 0.209 0.004 0.277 0.002 0.273 0.008
stud5_8 0.501 0.000 0.279 0.010 0.338 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.525 0.000
stud9_11 0.587 0.000 0.350 0.011 0.504 0.000 0.633 0.000 0.653 0.000
stud12pl 0.695 0.006 0.716 0.002 1.250 0.000 1.328 0.000 1.301 0.000
secsec 0.091 0.780 -0.041 0.879 0.139 0.437 0.188 0.213 0.079 0.775
tertsec -0.025 0.939 -0.159 0.543 -0.017 0.924 -0.062 0.685 -0.088 0.751
techadm 0.646 0.078 0.724 0.007 0.529 0.014 0.627 0.002 0.849 0.007
transfor 0.511 0.197 0.566 0.051 0.333 0.105 0.297 0.106 0.484 0.116
octracom 0.563 0.148 0.620 0.029 0.400 0.057 0.457 0.015 0.514 0.099
ocservic 0.463 0.224 0.533 0.051 0.311 0.116 0.474 0.013 0.529 0.095
NAoccup 0.231 0.532 0.336 0.235 0.255 0.206 0.254 0.147 0.227 0.435
carteira 0.464 0.000 0.376 0.000 0.298 0.000 0.247 0.000 0.201 0.031
_cons 3.349 0.000 3.886 0.000 4.259 0.000 4.622 0.000 4.876 0.000
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Appendix C1.  continued 
Bahia, all  Coef. P>|t|  Coef. P>|t|  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
female -0.327 0.000 -0.333 0.000 -0.375 0.000 -0.398 0.000 -0.409 0.000
white 0.125 0.031 0.085 0.061 0.114 0.007 0.076 0.123 0.139 0.020
union 0.136 0.078 0.119 0.028 0.126 0.026 0.145 0.083 0.136 0.135
urban 0.089 0.387 0.131 0.131 0.145 0.042 0.105 0.209 0.037 0.749
metropol 0.352 0.000 0.357 0.000 0.365 0.000 0.318 0.000 0.225 0.000
liveten -0.065 0.331 -0.035 0.458 -0.076 0.096 -0.033 0.517 -0.024 0.677
age21_30 0.512 0.010 0.375 0.000 0.339 0.000 0.335 0.000 0.243 0.002
age31_40 0.648 0.001 0.498 0.000 0.491 0.000 0.550 0.000 0.491 0.000
age41_50 0.771 0.000 0.618 0.000 0.595 0.000 0.524 0.000 0.493 0.000
age51_70 0.643 0.004 0.425 0.000 0.446 0.000 0.540 0.000 0.451 0.000
tenu1_2 -0.008 0.935 0.108 0.070 0.081 0.133 0.076 0.187 0.080 0.225
tenu3_6 0.066 0.498 0.169 0.010 0.168 0.004 0.183 0.010 0.304 0.001
tenu7_12 -0.003 0.980 0.138 0.156 0.272 0.001 0.249 0.003 0.306 0.007
tenu13p 0.136 0.366 0.274 0.005 0.424 0.000 0.604 0.000 0.620 0.000
stud1_4 0.034 0.693 0.090 0.117 0.202 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.245 0.006
stud5_8 0.063 0.574 0.193 0.010 0.298 0.000 0.377 0.000 0.385 0.000
stud9_11 0.322 0.015 0.226 0.009 0.390 0.000 0.527 0.000 0.657 0.000
stud12pl 0.825 0.000 0.785 0.000 1.151 0.000 1.348 0.000 1.362 0.000
secsec -0.010 0.958 0.140 0.336 0.076 0.616 0.171 0.178 0.348 0.003
tertsec -0.140 0.469 -0.055 0.708 -0.070 0.627 0.035 0.774 0.268 0.017
techadm 0.449 0.046 0.385 0.028 0.336 0.043 0.372 0.027 0.431 0.022
transfor 0.277 0.230 0.036 0.830 0.118 0.454 0.047 0.759 0.043 0.749
octracom 0.125 0.647 0.126 0.484 0.135 0.382 0.131 0.424 0.223 0.132
ocservic 0.279 0.242 0.123 0.474 0.107 0.515 0.129 0.438 0.126 0.407
NAoccup 0.022 0.921 -0.018 0.912 -0.028 0.860 -0.010 0.949 0.021 0.871
carteira 0.465 0.000 0.378 0.000 0.294 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.187 0.001
_cons 3.805 0.000 4.137 0.000 4.423 0.000 4.720 0.000 4.952 0.000
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Appendix C1.  continued 
Ceara, all  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef. P>|t|












white 0,140 0,119 0,131 0,016 0,147 0,013 0,148 0,038 0,205 0,007
union 0,199 0,080 0,216 0,001 0,198 0,011 0,117 0,140 0,203 0,055

















age21_30 0,511 0,004 0,397 0,000 0,325 0,001 0,405 0,000 0,301 0,011
age31_40 0,403 0,048 0,487 0,000 0,590 0,000 0,616 0,000 0,641 0,000
age41_50 0,494 0,030 0,508 0,000 0,604 0,000 0,691 0,000 0,498 0,001
age51_70 0,384 0,083 0,358 0,005 0,516 0,000 0,562 0,000 0,654 0,000
tenu1_2 0,260 0,162 0,179 0,168 0,072 0,441 0,034 0,745 0,024 0,838
tenu3_6 0,378 0,062 0,259 0,057 0,124 0,229 0,193 0,111 0,189 0,158
tenu7_12 0,525 0,011 0,325 0,023 0,249 0,036 0,258 0,033 0,181 0,170
tenu13p 0,642 0,006 0,433 0,005 0,218 0,058 0,276 0,085 0,269 0,223
stud1_4 0,067 0,576 0,210 0,018 0,297 0,000 0,257 0,007 0,093 0,358
stud5_8 0,206 0,120 0,245 0,004 0,351 0,000 0,347 0,001 0,229 0,028
stud9_11 0,296 0,078 0,369 0,002 0,609 0,000 0,638 0,000 0,663 0,000














0,162 0,058 0,716 0,080 0,715
techadm 0,605 0,027 0,913 0,000 0,955 0,000 1,058 0,000 1,233 0,000
transfor 0,687 0,025 0,718 0,004 0,652 0,001 0,650 0,001 0,582 0,013
octracom 0,558 0,054 0,716 0,002 0,629 0,003 0,687 0,000 0,779 0,003
ocservic 0,356 0,174 0,699 0,001 0,592 0,003 0,593 0,001 0,750 0,002
NAoccup 0,427 0,171 0,565 0,010 0,412 0,035 0,348 0,058 0,432 0,070
carteira 0,404 0,002 0,317 0,000 0,163 0,015 0,142 0,096 0,005 0,957
_cons 3,418 0,000 3,711 0,000 4,214 0,000 4,402 0,000 4,858 0,00047  47
 
Appendix C2.  Quantile regressions including males only 
NE, males  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef. P>|t|
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
white 0.139 0.003 0.155 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.163 0.000
union 0.183 0.000 0.148 0.000 0.125 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.162 0.004
urban -0.001 0.992 0.054 0.359 0.029 0.561 0.037 0.544 0.074 0.203
metropol 0.224 0.000 0.254 0.000 0.250 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.132 0.001
liveten -0.178 0.000 -0.124 0.000 -0.113 0.000 -0.130 0.000 -0.094 0.047
age21_30 0.425 0.000 0.344 0.000 0.361 0.000 0.384 0.000 0.366 0.000
age31_40 0.692 0.000 0.584 0.000 0.612 0.000 0.643 0.000 0.614 0.000
age41_50 0.757 0.000 0.635 0.000 0.666 0.000 0.733 0.000 0.643 0.000
age51_70 0.546 0.000 0.506 0.000 0.509 0.000 0.592 0.000 0.563 0.000
tenu1_2 0.130 0.088 0.100 0.040 0.066 0.095 0.050 0.332 0.070 0.208
tenu3_6 0.221 0.010 0.158 0.004 0.183 0.000 0.206 0.000 0.229 0.000
tenu7_12 0.275 0.002 0.274 0.000 0.262 0.000 0.257 0.000 0.252 0.000
tenu13p 0.345 0.003 0.308 0.000 0.297 0.000 0.350 0.000 0.499 0.000
stud1_4 0.134 0.064 0.163 0.001 0.205 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.276 0.000
stud5_8 0.277 0.000 0.266 0.000 0.336 0.000 0.409 0.000 0.441 0.000
stud9_11 0.454 0.000 0.366 0.000 0.498 0.000 0.656 0.000 0.752 0.000
stud12pl 0.797 0.000 0.856 0.000 1.184 0.000 1.181 0.000 1.312 0.000
secsec 0.173 0.262 0.164 0.058 0.065 0.533 0.093 0.215 0.194 0.053
tertsec 0.048 0.753 0.067 0.464 -0.005 0.967 -0.019 0.791 0.060 0.530
techadm 0.435 0.009 0.413 0.000 0.501 0.000 0.580 0.000 0.555 0.000
transfor 0.287 0.090 0.189 0.066 0.307 0.004 0.379 0.000 0.371 0.001
octracom 0.296 0.099 0.264 0.014 0.316 0.007 0.401 0.000 0.380 0.001
ocservic 0.092 0.604 0.090 0.445 0.198 0.114 0.395 0.000 0.341 0.006
NAoccup 0.064 0.702 -0.022 0.831 0.090 0.423 0.168 0.046 0.154 0.168
carteira 0.518 0.000 0.437 0.000 0.311 0.000 0.198 0.000 0.139 0.005
_cons 3.405 0.000 3.880 0.000 4.257 0.000 4.575 0.000 4.821 0.000
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Appendix C2.  continued 
Pernamb, 
males 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t|
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
white 0.186 0.062 0.155 0.031 0.094 0.187 0.175 0.007 0.197 0.036
union 0.188 0.103 0.037 0.666 0.073 0.435 0.243 0.008 0.313 0.003
urban -0.154 0.455 0.019 0.886 0.092 0.493 0.150 0.349 -0.123 0.530
metropol 0.361 0.001 0.313 0.001 0.282 0.002 0.126 0.078 0.119 0.239
liveten -0.288 0.005 -0.211 0.008 -0.213 0.006 -0.235 0.005 -0.229 0.082
age21_30 0.639 0.003 0.458 0.000 0.275 0.033 0.308 0.036 0.363 0.028
age31_40 0.780 0.002 0.663 0.000 0.515 0.000 0.578 0.000 0.507 0.001
age41_50 0.944 0.000 0.784 0.000 0.690 0.000 0.779 0.000 0.679 0.000
age51_70 0.946 0.000 0.619 0.000 0.456 0.004 0.621 0.000 0.530 0.005
tenu1_2 0.173 0.242 0.098 0.441 0.112 0.276 0.164 0.100 0.292 0.060
tenu3_6 0.202 0.158 0.089 0.494 0.161 0.153 0.190 0.104 0.396 0.022
tenu7_12 0.227 0.217 0.203 0.161 0.333 0.013 0.334 0.006 0.471 0.005
tenu13p 0.139 0.566 0.247 0.157 0.356 0.037 0.376 0.013 0.542 0.010
stud1_4 0.299 0.105 0.113 0.336 0.169 0.097 0.138 0.165 0.203 0.098
stud5_8 0.454 0.026 0.253 0.060 0.327 0.005 0.374 0.003 0.574 0.000
stud9_11 0.737 0.001 0.421 0.008 0.557 0.000 0.581 0.000 0.775 0.000
stud12pl 0.342 0.320 0.579 0.056 1.237 0.000 1.168 0.000 1.220 0.000
secsec 0.260 0.520 0.081 0.789 0.276 0.392 0.269 0.197 0.284 0.343
tertsec 0.170 0.676 0.034 0.913 0.184 0.560 0.091 0.671 0.105 0.740
techadm 0.692 0.126 0.661 0.028 0.459 0.119 0.695 0.003 0.699 0.060
transfor 0.535 0.251 0.489 0.101 0.274 0.361 0.376 0.050 0.293 0.372
octracom 0.512 0.274 0.482 0.127 0.279 0.378 0.495 0.011 0.493 0.135
ocservic 0.290 0.556 0.210 0.514 0.177 0.577 0.460 0.062 0.378 0.348
NAoccup 0.261 0.564 0.263 0.373 0.211 0.481 0.272 0.140 0.217 0.494
carteira 0.236 0.070 0.388 0.000 0.339 0.000 0.263 0.004 0.109 0.398
_cons 3.153 0.000 3.793 0.000 4.149 0.000 4.358 0.000 4.787 0.000
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Appendix C2.  continued 
Bahia, males  Coef. P>|t|  Coef. P>|t|  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
white 0.130 0.113 0.146 0.014 0.128 0.014 0.090 0.131 0.159 0.066
union 0.107 0.263 0.168 0.014 0.057 0.379 0.029 0.723 0.076 0.502
urban 0.144 0.302 0.224 0.028 0.209 0.054 0.120 0.310 0.116 0.356
metropol 0.264 0.010 0.195 0.007 0.257 0.000 0.259 0.000 0.175 0.026
liveten -0.070 0.488 -0.041 0.515 -0.054 0.435 0.007 0.914 0.014 0.864
age21_30 0.659 0.018 0.390 0.000 0.438 0.000 0.389 0.000 0.416 0.000
age31_40 0.980 0.000 0.614 0.000 0.637 0.000 0.570 0.000 0.665 0.000
age41_50 1.037 0.000 0.671 0.000 0.717 0.000 0.671 0.000 0.650 0.000
age51_70 0.855 0.002 0.546 0.000 0.609 0.000 0.564 0.000 0.634 0.000
tenu1_2 0.075 0.571 0.104 0.190 0.086 0.317 0.000 0.996 0.040 0.663
tenu3_6 0.218 0.145 0.163 0.073 0.194 0.041 0.092 0.351 0.158 0.172
tenu7_12 0.032 0.874 0.125 0.328 0.254 0.028 0.175 0.150 0.328 0.038
tenu13p 0.170 0.307 0.299 0.010 0.377 0.009 0.488 0.009 0.565 0.003
stud1_4 0.032 0.795 0.077 0.345 0.221 0.002 0.299 0.000 0.380 0.003
stud5_8 0.207 0.136 0.221 0.027 0.369 0.000 0.449 0.000 0.581 0.000
stud9_11 0.244 0.204 0.132 0.280 0.389 0.002 0.541 0.000 0.686 0.000
stud12pl 1.057 0.000 0.883 0.000 1.202 0.000 1.187 0.000 1.228 0.003
secsec 0.022 0.951 0.370 0.089 0.107 0.554 0.253 0.174 0.262 0.186
tertsec -0.296 0.417 0.220 0.350 0.018 0.926 0.190 0.315 0.092 0.654
techadm 0.506 0.164 0.234 0.289 0.340 0.077 0.239 0.237 0.530 0.061
transfor 0.222 0.529 -0.055 0.792 0.180 0.253 0.024 0.893 0.210 0.306
octracom 0.309 0.438 -0.011 0.961 0.163 0.361 0.115 0.589 0.326 0.117
ocservic 0.347 0.458 0.070 0.799 0.026 0.903 -0.003 0.990 0.316 0.232
NAoccup 0.010 0.979 -0.248 0.286 -0.100 0.554 -0.130 0.521 0.054 0.801
carteira 0.643 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.263 0.000 0.220 0.001 0.198 0.012
_cons 3.386 0.000 3.932 0.000 4.261 0.000 4.664 0.000 4.660 0.000
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Appendix C2.  continued 
Ceara, males  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t|
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
white 0,177 0,130 0,146 0,092 0,123 0,093 0,140 0,094 0,213 0,056
union 0,212 0,109 0,182 0,056 0,047 0,631 0,033 0,738 0,226 0,050
urban 0,229 0,325 0,208 0,252 -0,035 0,814 0,081 0,544 -0,096 0,544
metropol 0,331 0,020 0,363 0,000 0,305 0,000 0,294 0,001 0,212 0,055
liveten -0,265 0,025 -0,146 0,111 -0,239 0,011 -0,138 0,184 -0,255 0,016
age21_30 0,416 0,042 0,279 0,104 0,328 0,026 0,352 0,024 0,384 0,014
age31_40 0,311 0,179 0,332 0,073 0,620 0,000 0,672 0,000 0,759 0,000
age41_50 0,537 0,025 0,419 0,042 0,680 0,000 0,676 0,000 0,644 0,001
age51_70 0,338 0,198 0,240 0,285 0,592 0,001 0,428 0,013 0,727 0,001
tenu1_2 0,300 0,192 0,155 0,359 0,057 0,700 -0,097 0,543 -0,068 0,671
tenu3_6 0,496 0,044 0,322 0,049 0,152 0,388 0,153 0,390 0,158 0,370
tenu7_12 0,550 0,029 0,493 0,007 0,348 0,038 0,155 0,394 0,124 0,508
tenu13p 0,779 0,004 0,575 0,004 0,350 0,041 0,241 0,165 0,111 0,647
stud1_4 0,072 0,668 0,227 0,054 0,313 0,003 0,272 0,012 0,026 0,859
stud5_8 0,039 0,825 0,152 0,307 0,322 0,008 0,330 0,012 0,218 0,136
stud9_11 0,202 0,386 0,406 0,059 0,733 0,000 0,763 0,000 0,864 0,000
stud12pl 0,190 0,547 0,657 0,044 0,744 0,031 1,173 0,000 0,943 0,000
secsec -0,204 0,493 -0,020 0,935 0,070 0,745 0,114 0,575 0,266 0,315
tertsec -0,258 0,352 -0,190 0,437 -0,035 0,876 -0,005 0,982 -0,006 0,984
techadm 0,775 0,024 0,756 0,016 0,928 0,000 1,148 0,000 1,240 0,000
transfor 0,610 0,083 0,502 0,104 0,607 0,010 0,793 0,000 0,770 0,011
octracom 0,565 0,153 0,526 0,092 0,586 0,024 0,805 0,002 1,018 0,004
ocservic 0,513 0,139 0,528 0,073 0,526 0,031 0,723 0,002 0,804 0,019
NAoccup 0,222 0,541 0,334 0,265 0,282 0,238 0,431 0,036 0,616 0,051
carteira 0,665 0,000 0,460 0,000 0,237 0,017 0,025 0,825 -0,113 0,395











Appendix C3.  Quantile regressions including females 
NE, females  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef. P>|t|
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
white 0.124 0.008 0.132 0.000 0.171 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.194 0.000
union 0.207 0.009 0.187 0.001 0.201 0.000 0.113 0.085 0.154 0.076
urban 0.158 0.048 0.150 0.086 0.076 0.152 0.036 0.657 -0.048 0.675
metropol 0.364 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.415 0.000 0.374 0.000 0.279 0.000
liveten 0.025 0.656 -0.074 0.042 -0.068 0.028 -0.048 0.216 0.001 0.985
age21_30 0.323 0.002 0.225 0.000 0.209 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.174 0.006
age31_40 0.216 0.034 0.242 0.000 0.366 0.000 0.380 0.000 0.326 0.000
age41_50 0.302 0.004 0.343 0.000 0.401 0.000 0.420 0.000 0.330 0.000
age51_70 0.258 0.021 0.229 0.002 0.265 0.001 0.319 0.002 0.386 0.000
tenu1_2 0.050 0.511 0.035 0.456 -0.016 0.667 0.016 0.742 -0.063 0.330
tenu3_6 0.100 0.195 0.162 0.003 0.090 0.026 0.144 0.010 0.077 0.263
tenu7_12 0.239 0.004 0.167 0.007 0.118 0.035 0.240 0.001 0.146 0.138
tenu13p 0.191 0.059 0.213 0.012 0.292 0.000 0.345 0.001 0.400 0.001
stud1_4 0.127 0.121 0.173 0.002 0.207 0.000 0.184 0.000 0.155 0.022
stud5_8 0.261 0.000 0.231 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.237 0.000 0.258 0.003
stud9_11 0.307 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.296 0.000 0.410 0.000 0.420 0.000
stud12pl 0.730 0.000 0.669 0.000 0.887 0.000 1.122 0.000 1.197 0.000
secsec -0.300 0.147 -0.289 0.041 -0.137 0.142 -0.058 0.614 0.186 0.149
tertsec -0.499 0.008 -0.528 0.000 -0.358 0.000 -0.250 0.013 0.002 0.988
techadm 0.576 0.046 0.932 0.000 0.885 0.002 0.544 0.018 0.692 0.000
transfor 0.329 0.296 0.581 0.001 0.581 0.037 0.222 0.342 0.144 0.498
octracom 0.509 0.100 0.708 0.000 0.693 0.014 0.303 0.183 0.401 0.041
ocservic 0.440 0.126 0.662 0.000 0.592 0.033 0.284 0.213 0.298 0.104
NAoccup 0.329 0.266 0.563 0.001 0.518 0.056 0.150 0.508 0.211 0.257
carteira 0.366 0.000 0.297 0.000 0.241 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.138 0.005
_cons 3.508 0.000 3.737 0.000 3.987 0.000 4.565 0.000 4.859 0.000
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Appendix C3.  continued 
Pernamb, 
females 
Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t|
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
white 0.248 0.015 0.320 0.000 0.178 0.036 0.191 0.023 0.140 0.267
union 0.395 0.010 0.326 0.005 0.220 0.071 -0.081 0.564 -0.156 0.379
urban 0.030 0.917 0.078 0.783 0.224 0.338 0.008 0.965 0.071 0.752
metropol 0.434 0.000 0.407 0.000 0.377 0.001 0.450 0.000 0.445 0.001
liveten -0.071 0.500 -0.024 0.741 -0.002 0.986 0.018 0.851 -0.169 0.295
age21_30 0.141 0.329 0.148 0.176 0.064 0.653 0.168 0.178 0.242 0.269
age31_40 0.203 0.281 0.221 0.071 0.250 0.093 0.264 0.052 0.335 0.135
age41_50 0.112 0.584 0.286 0.034 0.307 0.056 0.292 0.060 0.511 0.037
age51_70 0.377 0.147 0.212 0.317 0.140 0.507 0.207 0.264 0.318 0.180
tenu1_2 -0.040 0.785 0.053 0.618 -0.005 0.976 -0.146 0.354 -0.194 0.595
tenu3_6 0.264 0.136 0.361 0.005 0.191 0.229 -0.014 0.926 -0.128 0.715
tenu7_12 0.135 0.529 0.347 0.042 0.191 0.378 0.216 0.362 0.189 0.654
tenu13p 0.356 0.301 0.544 0.109 0.494 0.028 0.098 0.652 0.250 0.545
stud1_4 0.384 0.118 0.227 0.284 0.127 0.378 0.315 0.048 0.161 0.452
stud5_8 0.394 0.085 0.336 0.130 0.303 0.035 0.328 0.071 0.463 0.088
stud9_11 0.531 0.025 0.409 0.084 0.307 0.092 0.413 0.079 0.538 0.080
stud12pl 0.978 0.001 0.922 0.002 1.033 0.000 1.183 0.000 1.250 0.002
secsec -0.051 0.892 -0.142 0.704 -0.283 0.405 -0.249 0.521 -0.187 0.650
tertsec -0.311 0.339 -0.406 0.228 -0.419 0.199 -0.514 0.174 -0.431 0.279
techadm 0.807 0.143 0.895 0.123 1.208 0.015 1.145 0.025 1.233 0.035
transfor 0.311 0.609 0.684 0.265 1.130 0.023 0.594 0.254 0.738 0.221
octracom 0.744 0.196 0.799 0.177 1.277 0.013 0.854 0.124 0.945 0.152
ocservic 0.692 0.189 0.785 0.175 1.067 0.035 0.774 0.130 0.896 0.114
NAoccup 0.374 0.506 0.624 0.316 0.999 0.041 0.640 0.195 0.789 0.152
carteira 0.526 0.000 0.262 0.004 0.278 0.010 0.226 0.019 0.207 0.121
_cons 3.135 0.000 3.437 0.000 3.533 0.000 4.458 0.000 4.637 0.000
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Appendix C3.  continued 
Bahia, females  Coef. P>|t|  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
white 0.040 0.708 0.104 0.095 0.093 0.090 0.123 0.098 0.084 0.339
union 0.148 0.251 0.111 0.347 0.277 0.081 0.418 0.005 0.193 0.144
urban -0.223 0.395 -0.037 0.792 0.054 0.670 0.022 0.901 -0.116 0.575
metropol 0.445 0.000 0.464 0.000 0.444 0.000 0.406 0.000 0.227 0.012
liveten -0.209 0.083 -0.036 0.637 -0.078 0.239 -0.039 0.549 -0.050 0.547
age21_30 0.276 0.215 0.325 0.002 0.232 0.034 0.260 0.023 0.114 0.335
age31_40 0.161 0.545 0.378 0.003 0.347 0.003 0.397 0.000 0.256 0.037
age41_50 0.477 0.037 0.520 0.000 0.359 0.002 0.296 0.022 0.296 0.061
age51_70 0.173 0.600 0.260 0.074 0.257 0.100 0.436 0.049 0.399 0.075
tenu1_2 0.170 0.168 0.132 0.111 0.148 0.036 0.142 0.092 0.168 0.069
tenu3_6 0.101 0.536 0.200 0.059 0.143 0.120 0.258 0.035 0.465 0.000
tenu7_12 0.307 0.115 0.201 0.110 0.300 0.005 0.371 0.003 0.463 0.002
tenu13p 0.582 0.027 0.389 0.011 0.570 0.000 0.807 0.000 0.704 0.001
stud1_4 0.018 0.912 0.155 0.138 0.063 0.482 0.222 0.032 0.222 0.084
stud5_8 0.156 0.298 0.232 0.050 0.148 0.167 0.300 0.003 0.457 0.001
stud9_11 0.291 0.124 0.369 0.011 0.321 0.015 0.421 0.008 0.918 0.000
stud12pl 0.582 0.032 0.756 0.002 0.979 0.000 1.251 0.000 1.476 0.000
secsec -0.268 0.420 -0.105 0.650 -0.006 0.975 0.249 0.145 0.477 0.023
tertsec -0.398 0.091 -0.223 0.227 -0.190 0.221 -0.018 0.906 0.279 0.114
techadm 0.351 0.418 0.575 0.202 0.089 0.819 -0.043 0.889 -0.082 0.791
transfor -0.129 0.778 0.065 0.886 -0.200 0.608 -0.471 0.111 -0.495 0.124
octracom 0.104 0.822 0.299 0.505 -0.113 0.762 -0.268 0.343 -0.275 0.344
ocservic 0.154 0.709 0.292 0.505 -0.053 0.884 -0.134 0.621 -0.149 0.599
NAoccup 0.084 0.841 0.228 0.611 -0.096 0.798 -0.203 0.451 -0.073 0.794
carteira 0.513 0.000 0.291 0.001 0.308 0.000 0.146 0.071 0.139 0.084
_cons 4.297 0.000 3.966 0.000 4.604 0.000 4.757 0.000 5.045 0.000
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Appendix C3.  continued 
Ceara, females  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t|
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
white 0,090 0,585 0,067 0,540 0,173 0,111 0,253 0,020 0,362 0,002
union 0,202 0,449 0,194 0,256 0,321 0,106 0,431 0,063 0,222 0,457
urban 0,166 0,654 -0,228 0,497 -0,064 0,774 -0,321 0,325 -0,334 0,343
metropol 0,842 0,000 0,742 0,000 0,500 0,000 0,436 0,002 0,404 0,005
liveten -0,241 0,138 -0,221 0,075 -0,143 0,233 -0,110 0,415 -0,017 0,912
age21_30 0,402 0,070 0,588 0,002 0,372 0,021 0,395 0,006 0,536 0,004
age31_40 0,511 0,043 0,520 0,009 0,508 0,006 0,548 0,001 0,623 0,010
age41_50 0,274 0,320 0,563 0,008 0,467 0,026 0,484 0,052 0,488 0,059
age51_70 0,365 0,253 0,361 0,166 0,337 0,156 0,625 0,026 0,683 0,050
tenu1_2 0,234 0,379 0,067 0,770 -0,048 0,747 -0,020 0,889 0,001 0,994
tenu3_6 0,124 0,643 0,065 0,796 -0,038 0,810 -0,091 0,593 0,110 0,603
tenu7_12 0,279 0,296 0,190 0,453 -0,124 0,519 0,169 0,503 0,054 0,850
tenu13p 0,391 0,258 0,122 0,687 -0,059 0,827 -0,200 0,583 0,291 0,496
stud1_4 -0,046 0,844 0,085 0,641 0,277 0,052 0,173 0,324 0,263 0,188
stud5_8 0,224 0,317 0,154 0,307 0,304 0,018 0,357 0,027 0,420 0,029
stud9_11 -0,025 0,941 0,086 0,690 0,378 0,058 0,580 0,008 0,599 0,027
stud12pl 0,312 0,385 0,490 0,123 0,844 0,004 0,751 0,032 0,661 0,277
secsec 0,092 0,876 -0,902 0,069 -0,568 0,203 -0,362 0,486 0,063 0,907
tertsec -0,291 0,587 -0,926 0,044 -0,780 0,052 -0,448 0,339 -0,053 0,914
techadm -0,031 0,953 0,788 0,089 1,015 0,047 1,395 0,023 1,548 0,029
transfor -0,502 0,363 0,674 0,173 0,722 0,175 0,872 0,141 0,688 0,293
octracom -0,487 0,393 0,519 0,271 0,804 0,129 1,031 0,073 0,892 0,187
ocservic -0,519 0,320 0,456 0,330 0,745 0,144 0,905 0,117 0,937 0,144
NAoccup -0,381 0,478 0,648 0,164 0,721 0,156 0,651 0,295 0,690 0,333
carteira 0,315 0,050 0,272 0,009 0,145 0,186 0,213 0,094 0,141 0,422
_cons 3,937 0,000 4,374 0,000 4,258 0,000 4,248 0,000 3,909 0,000
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Appendix C4.  Quantile regressions including rural areas 
NE, rural  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef.  P>|t| Coef. P>|t|
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
female -0.468 0.022 -0.437 0.002 -0.436 0.001 -0.392 0.002 -0.396 0.006
white 0.188 0.164 0.055 0.525 0.025 0.707 0.111 0.213 0.208 0.083
union -0.016 0.929 -0.048 0.704 -0.092 0.364 -0.146 0.136 -0.238 0.127
metropol 0.514 0.000 0.401 0.000 0.392 0.000 0.426 0.000 0.420 0.004
liveten 0.012 0.932 -0.074 0.387 -0.045 0.543 0.018 0.832 0.041 0.684
age21_30 0.399 0.203 0.330 0.066 0.352 0.000 0.472 0.000 0.434 0.002
age31_40 0.466 0.158 0.515 0.007 0.523 0.000 0.597 0.000 0.539 0.001
age41_50 0.249 0.454 0.333 0.108 0.490 0.000 0.554 0.000 0.432 0.009
age51_70 0.385 0.245 0.335 0.122 0.373 0.006 0.559 0.000 0.402 0.023
tenu1_2 -0.098 0.568 0.033 0.786 0.068 0.511 -0.098 0.426 -0.116 0.410
tenu3_6 -0.071 0.740 -0.138 0.276 -0.087 0.437 -0.283 0.029 -0.191 0.283
tenu7_12 -0.178 0.505 0.031 0.827 0.066 0.628 -0.111 0.476 -0.028 0.871
tenu13p -0.065 0.783 -0.168 0.275 -0.119 0.350 -0.363 0.019 -0.175 0.501
stud1_4 0.093 0.563 0.013 0.906 0.212 0.014 0.270 0.002 0.226 0.015
stud5_8 0.224 0.245 0.151 0.259 0.363 0.002 0.479 0.000 0.326 0.017
stud9_11 0.208 0.373 0.264 0.118 0.329 0.075 0.207 0.400 0.491 0.222
stud12pl 0.704 0.173 1.325 0.008 1.722 0.000 1.854 0.000 2.119 0.000
secsec 0.566 0.144 0.228 0.569 0.022 0.943 0.061 0.809 0.199 0.434
tertsec 0.475 0.194 0.115 0.738 -0.097 0.753 -0.229 0.404 -0.066 0.819
techadm 0.090 0.821 0.195 0.602 0.505 0.104 0.690 0.005 0.500 0.049
transfor -0.231 0.595 -0.019 0.961 0.272 0.375 0.143 0.579 0.027 0.925
octracom 0.055 0.898 0.364 0.319 0.473 0.157 0.628 0.041 0.426 0.160
ocservic -0.255 0.534 -0.070 0.845 0.245 0.451 0.374 0.202 0.626 0.046
NAoccup -0.395 0.321 -0.391 0.290 0.061 0.846 0.034 0.901 -0.192 0.506
carteira 0.555 0.000 0.446 0.000 0.408 0.000 0.359 0.000 0.353 0.002
_cons 3.697 0.000 4.334 0.000 4.436 0.000 4.743 0.000 5.008 0.000
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Appendix C4.  continued 
Pernamb, rural  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t|
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
female -0.533 0.266 -0.473 0.272 -0.372 0.321 -0.507 0.164 -0.972 0.021
white 0.372 0.205 0.215 0.410 0.023 0.913 0.016 0.941 0.118 0.634
union 0.416 0.388 0.256 0.526 -0.371 0.283 -0.185 0.518 -0.430 0.212
metropol 0.535 0.224 0.719 0.061 0.664 0.087 0.774 0.054 0.973 0.031
liveten -0.595 0.101 -0.449 0.131 -0.229 0.249 -0.062 0.751 -0.159 0.502
age21_30 0.752 0.171 0.922 0.043 0.304 0.392 0.453 0.171 0.876 0.022
age31_40 0.314 0.564 0.421 0.374 0.124 0.742 0.381 0.317 0.722 0.056
age41_50 1.252 0.048 1.274 0.027 0.623 0.222 0.829 0.097 1.243 0.009
age51_70 0.396 0.454 0.552 0.230 0.104 0.794 0.359 0.354 0.415 0.273
tenu1_2 -1.350 0.067 -1.007 0.096 -0.418 0.398 -0.303 0.464 0.035 0.938
tenu3_6 -0.220 0.749 -0.440 0.427 -0.470 0.315 -0.446 0.321 -0.402 0.432
tenu7_12 -0.724 0.316 -0.622 0.255 -0.041 0.936 -0.138 0.740 0.006 0.990
tenu13p -0.334 0.656 -0.423 0.524 -0.231 0.646 -0.538 0.259 -0.150 0.781
stud1_4 0.249 0.472 0.272 0.416 0.110 0.651 0.067 0.765 -0.033 0.893
stud5_8 0.584 0.397 0.470 0.466 -0.407 0.477 -0.060 0.901 0.359 0.494
stud9_11 1.117 0.345 0.567 0.585 -0.001 0.999 -0.278 0.728 -0.381 0.637
stud12pl 2.662 0.005 2.319 0.005 2.278 0.007 1.826 0.028 1.081 0.201
secsec -1.709 0.172 -1.134 0.258 0.288 0.694 1.091 0.121 0.805 0.307
tertsec -1.902 0.140 -1.333 0.205 0.357 0.630 1.120 0.124 1.340 0.086
techadm 1.821 0.057 1.422 0.064 0.280 0.630 0.070 0.904 -0.035 0.958
transfor 2.497 0.033 1.782 0.070 0.033 0.965 -0.973 0.175 -1.346 0.095
octracom 2.486 0.077 1.967 0.080 -0.040 0.961 -0.944 0.230 -1.487 0.092
ocservic 3.002 0.031 2.224 0.053 0.600 0.499 -0.330 0.717 -0.842 0.371
NAoccup 2.546 0.058 1.550 0.149 -0.373 0.635 -1.012 0.172 -1.157 0.137
carteira 0.327 0.345 0.272 0.347 0.449 0.029 0.325 0.067 0.431 0.045
_cons 4.298 0.000 4.348 0.000 4.961 0.000 4.968 0.000 4.866 0.000
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Appendix C4.  continued 
Bahia, rural  Coef. P>|t|  Coef. P>|t|  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| 
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
female -0.398 0.157 -0.219 0.384 0.076 0.777 -0.019 0.941 -0.084 0.774
white 0.124 0.539 0.011 0.950 -0.189 0.292 -0.105 0.552 -0.022 0.910
union -0.234 0.453 -0.307 0.254 -0.129 0.589 -0.288 0.173 -0.287 0.302
metropol 0.205 0.322 0.251 0.209 0.104 0.644 -0.104 0.658 0.011 0.966
liveten -0.288 0.147 -0.349 0.082 -0.055 0.780 -0.044 0.828 0.018 0.936
age21_30 0.802 0.069 0.498 0.351 0.365 0.344 0.325 0.254 0.312 0.200
age31_40 1.318 0.002 0.864 0.081 0.461 0.164 0.405 0.117 0.699 0.006
age41_50 1.173 0.011 1.019 0.070 0.299 0.478 0.656 0.069 0.588 0.154
age51_70 1.330 0.006 1.019 0.046 0.480 0.184 0.693 0.024 0.510 0.126
tenu1_2 -0.033 0.880 -0.088 0.723 0.020 0.937 -0.271 0.298 -0.294 0.247
tenu3_6 -0.187 0.470 -0.201 0.432 -0.112 0.633 -0.345 0.194 -0.020 0.949
tenu7_12 -0.157 0.638 -0.286 0.400 0.002 0.995 -0.205 0.497 -0.205 0.495
tenu13p -0.280 0.419 -0.221 0.512 0.009 0.981 -0.145 0.734 0.137 0.728
stud1_4 -0.185 0.393 0.030 0.887 0.236 0.250 0.441 0.027 0.300 0.150
stud5_8 0.180 0.455 0.550 0.037 0.348 0.151 0.693 0.003 0.683 0.017
stud9_11 0.967 0.153 0.459 0.501 0.698 0.316 0.592 0.445 1.230 0.116
stud12pl 2.060 0.077 1.383 0.212 0.436 0.693 2.805 0.021 2.697 0.039
secsec 0.310 0.692 0.130 0.873 0.043 0.955 0.625 0.465 0.543 0.539
tertsec -0.561 0.428 -0.346 0.617 -0.445 0.535 0.124 0.875 -0.284 0.746
techadm 0.262 0.684 0.556 0.344 0.961 0.133 0.221 0.760 -0.049 0.950
transfor 0.034 0.967 -0.035 0.967 -0.031 0.969 -0.345 0.708 -0.466 0.631
octracom 1.109 0.147 0.883 0.239 1.147 0.142 0.566 0.539 0.528 0.599
ocservic 0.957 0.225 0.524 0.474 0.307 0.691 -0.132 0.870 0.327 0.712
NAoccup 0.443 0.514 0.257 0.707 0.259 0.714 -0.563 0.479 -0.543 0.537
carteira 0.420 0.047 0.534 0.002 0.481 0.011 0.219 0.263 0.095 0.659
_cons 3.699 0.000 4.199 0.000 4.592 0.000 5.001 0.000 5.156 0.00058  58
 
Appendix C4.  continued 
Ceara, rural  Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t| Coef. P>|t|
  q10  q25  q50  q75  q90  
female 0,057 0,948 -0,183 0,825 -0,131 0,864 -0,065 0,929 -0,245 0,740
white 0,286 0,627 0,237 0,658 0,307 0,528 0,333 0,461 0,499 0,329
union 0,246 0,778 0,555 0,501 -0,140 0,835 -0,360 0,592 -0,194 0,778
metropol 0,889 0,162 0,620 0,270 0,495 0,349 0,134 0,818 0,276 0,659
liveten -0,056 0,926 -0,199 0,721 0,240 0,665 0,305 0,576 0,218 0,700
age21_30 0,687 0,516 0,188 0,841 0,319 0,706 0,445 0,639 0,449 0,666
age31_40 1,324 0,234 0,886 0,363 0,950 0,243 0,413 0,642 0,910 0,348
age41_50 1,461 0,172 0,227 0,808 0,525 0,529 0,038 0,969 0,476 0,665
age51_70 1,040 0,418 0,181 0,875 0,248 0,803 -0,098 0,927 -0,280 0,812
tenu1_2 0,128 0,848 0,661 0,312 0,636 0,283 0,846 0,169 0,596 0,290
tenu3_6 -0,713 0,393 -0,123 0,882 -0,023 0,976 0,336 0,661 0,188 0,819
tenu7_12 -0,333 0,663 0,434 0,532 0,315 0,591 0,372 0,477 0,538 0,339
tenu13p 0,654 0,397 0,797 0,267 0,267 0,691 0,374 0,584 0,540 0,422
stud1_4 0,937 0,115 0,345 0,531 0,124 0,796 -0,153 0,768 -0,151 0,781
stud5_8 1,839 0,095 1,044 0,283 0,617 0,439 0,365 0,640 0,039 0,962
stud9_11 2,432 0,043 1,864 0,083 1,113 0,247 0,463 0,649 0,407 0,708
stud12pl 1,010 0,540 0,502 0,751 1,586 0,273 1,241 0,411 -0,069 0,965
secsec -3,594 0,113 -4,143 0,059 -0,697 0,692 -0,132 0,938 0,090 0,958
tertsec -2,235 0,182 -2,021 0,180 -1,146 0,344 -0,617 0,611 -0,188 0,879
techadm 1,655 0,428 1,248 0,502 0,498 0,749 1,054 0,488 1,641 0,293
transfor 4,484 0,061 4,533 0,051 0,796 0,670 1,213 0,514 0,886 0,659
octracom 2,798 0,180 1,932 0,311 1,375 0,368 0,721 0,624 0,459 0,760
ocservic 1,579 0,336 1,580 0,303 0,738 0,563 0,284 0,819 0,099 0,936
NAoccup 2,299 0,200 1,876 0,248 1,163 0,374 0,880 0,478 0,731 0,577
carteira 0,381 0,572 0,276 0,655 0,290 0,623 0,498 0,409 0,127 0,850
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Appendix D.  TABLE D2. ADJ-R-SQUARED FROM OLS REGRESSIONS 




Bahia  0.456 0.431 0.436 0.374 0.441 0.449 0.432  0.368  0.407 
Pernambuco  0.468 0.482 0.423 0.539 0.431 0.430 0.465  0.408  0.328 
Ceara  0.530 0.514 0.485 0.529 0.497 0.511 0.467  0.459  0.395 
NE  0.469 0.447 0.464 0.418 0.449 0.441 0.443  0.371  0.388 
Brazil  0.519 0.517 0.507 0.368 0.511 0.501 0.439  0.373  0.405 60  60
 






         
female         female          female      female      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.54 0.62 0.60 0.93    q10  0.60 0.90 0.77 0.67 q10  0.32 0.12 0.12 0.40  q10  0.43 0.78 0.93 0.30 
q25    0.89 0.99 0.70    q25    0.38 0.33 0.35 q25    0.44 0.44 0.97  q25    0.57 0.37 0.60 
q50     0.91  0,73    q50      0.75 0.62 q50     0.86  0.61  q50     0.53  0.34 
q75      0.62    q75        0.75 q75      0.43  q75      0.09 
                          
white         white          white      white      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.84 0.74  0.9  0.82    q10  0.09 0.13 0.56 0.71 q10  0.68 0.15 0.36 0.62  q10  0.96 0.21 0.27 0.31 
q25    0.81 0.97 0.92    q25    0.87 0.30 0.36 q25    0.12 0.46 0.81  q25    0.07 0.18 0.24 
q50     0.75  0,95    q50      0.23 0.33 q50     0.58  0.46  q50     0.96  0.89 
q75      0.88    q75        0.87 q75      0.69  q75      0.84 
                          
union         union          union      union      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.18 0.14 0.24 0.05    q10  0.56 0.74 0.08 0.48 q10  0.54 0.69 0.71 0.18  q10  0.45 0.01 0.00 0.00 
q25    0.64 0.86 0.23    q25    0.80 0.07 0.68 q25    0.13 0.26 0.04  q25    0.00 0.00 0.00 
q50     0.85  0,30    q50      0.02 0.55 q50     0.96  0.10  q50     0.00  0.03 
q75      0.21    q75        0.35 q75      0.10  q75      0.88 
                          
urban         urban          urban      urban      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.43 0.78 0.88 0.96    q10  0.27 0.20 0.18 0.23 q10  0.20 0.32 0.10 0.06  q10  0.27 0.59 0.46 0.44 
q25    0.55 0.24 0.41    q25    0.59 0.56 0.64 q25    0.85 0.39 0.26  q25    0.51 0.91 0.94 
q50     0.43  0,63    q50      0.87 0.90 q50     0.19  0.14  q50     0.59  0.62 
q75      0.87    q75        0.99 q75      0.56  q75      0.96 
                          61  61
metropol        metropol         metropol      metropol      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.75 0.51 0.05 0.14    q10  0.18 0.02 0.00 0.00 q10  0.90 0.86 0.18 0.15  q10  0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q25    0.57 0.02 0.12    q25    0.08 0.01 0.01 q25    0.91 0.08 0.07  q25    0.03 0.00 0.00 
q50     0.01  0,19    q50      0.15 0.06 q50     0.03  0.05  q50     0.00  0.00 





















PERNAMBUCO  NORTH-EAST 
liveten         liveten  liveten    liveten 
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.88 1.00 0.53 0.69    q10  0.36 0.23 0.46 0.42 q10  0.94 0.83 0.47 0.72  q10  0.60 0.65 0.96 0.34 
q25    0.84 0.30 0.49    q25    0.47 0.92 0.79 q25    0.84 0.47 0.76  q25    0.99 0.59 0.11 
q50     0.26  0,56    q50      0.60 0.85 q50     0.43  0.84  q50     0.51  0.07 
q75      0.66    q75        0.81 q75      0.69  q75      0.12 
                          
age21_30         age21_30          age21_30      age21_30      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.11 0.05 0.04 0.02    q10  0.46 0.02 0.12 0.11 q10  0.13 0.05 0.02 0.04  q10  0.10 0.03 0.04 0.02 
q25    0.10 0.12 0.01    q25    0.02 0.24 0.22 q25    0.34 0.10 0.33  q25    0.11 0.21 0.07 
q50     0.64  0,12    q50      0.29 0.50 q50     0.25  0.77  q50     0.96  0.35 
q75      0.16    q75        0.83 q75      0.55  q75      0.27 
                          
age31_40         age31_40          age31_40      age31_40      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.12 0.08 0.08 0.06    q10  0.70 0.33 0.82 0.92 q10  0.35 0.21 0.11 0.53  q10  0.39 0.47 0.69 0.46 
q25    0.37 0.40 0.26    q25    0.35 0.88 0.61 q25    0.53 0.26 0.88  q25    0.95 0.55 0.90 
q50     0.81  0,57    q50      0.20 0.15 q50     0.37  0.53  q50     0.45  0.83 
q75      0.63    q75        0.59 q75      0.12  q75      0.43 
                          
age41_50         Age41_50          age41_50      age41_50      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.10 0.08 0.03 0.02    q10  0.41 0.07 0.37 0.46 q10  0.23 0.23 0.19 0.32  q10  0.34 0.26 0.43 0.21 
q25    0.54 0.13 0.06    q25    0.09 0.79 0.87 q25    0.85 0.59 0.93  q25    0.54 0.93 0.38 
q50     0.18  0,14    q50      0.14 0.26 q50     0.61  0.97  q50     0.59  0.56 
q75      0.52    q75        0.96 q75      0.62  q75      0.23 62  62
                          
age51_70         Age51_70          age51_70      age51_70      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.19 0.31 0.26 0.22    q10  0.28 0.08 0.41 0.86 q10  0.08 0.11 0.12 0.45  q10  0.82 0.85 0.66 0.88 
q25    0.53 0.87 0.84    q25    0.28 0.92 0.46 q25    0.89 0.99 0.37  q25    0.98 0.27 0.63 
q50     0.71  0,51    q50      0.19 0.08 q50     0.87  0.37  q50     0.15  0.58 

















tenu1_2         tenu1_2          tenu1_2      tenu1_2      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.39 0.99 0.76 0.84    q10  0.94 0.66 0.55 0.55 q10  0.42 0.60 0.84 0.61  q10  0.88 0.41 0.42 0.47 
q25    0.26 0.22 0.65    q25    0.45 0.36 0.40 q25    0.07 0.65 0.32  q25    0.19 0.27 0.36 
q50     0.62  0,74    q50      0.68 0.71 q50     0.32  0.80  q50     0.89  0.95 
q75      0.36    q75        0.95 q75      0.37  q75      0.97 
                 
tenu3_6         tenu3_6  tenu3_6    tenu3_6 
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.22 0.30 0.16 0.13    q10  0.96 0.60 0.91 0.78 q10  0.48 0.36 0.44 0.32  q10  0.65 0.93 0.59 0.31 
q25    0.96 0.51 0.36    q25    0.28 0.80 0.66 q25    0.62 0.77 0.49  q25    0.58 0.77 0.31 
q50     0.49  0,39    q50      0.50 0.76 q50     0.92  0.60  q50     0.35  0.12 
q75      0.67    q75        0.74 q75      0.53  q75      0.32 
                          
tenu7_12        tenu7_12          tenu7_12      tenu7_12      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.40 0.26 0.52 0.32    q10  0.71 0.49 0.49 0.24 q10  0.57 0.97 0.85 0.89  q10  0.75 0.53 0.47 0.34 
q25    0.46 0.95 0.62    q25    0.51 0.57 0.22 q25    0.40 0.75 0.59  q25    0.58 0.50 0.36 
q50     0.49  0,99    q50      0.98 0.45 q50     0.70  0.89  q50     0.76  0.52 
q75      0.50    q75        0.31 q75      0.69  q75      0.65 
                          
tenu13p         tenu13p          tenu13p      tenu13p      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.14 0.25 0.18 0.07    q10  0.79 0.73 0.89 0.54 q10  0.66 0.23 0.17 0.75  q10  0.80 0.57 0.28 0.17 
q25    0.86 0.83 0.35    q25    0.33 0.59 0.34 q25    0.28 0.21 0.97  q25    0.23 0.11 0.05 
q50     0.65  0,21    q50      0.77 0.62 q50     0.60  0.51  q50     0.33  0.18 
q75      0.29    q75        0.45 q75      0.26  q75      0.49 
                          63  63
stud1_4         stud1_4          stud1_4      stud1_4      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.47 0.37 0.05 0.22    q10  0.36 0.25 0.29 0.10 q10  0.57 0.93 0.83 0.10  q10  0.35 0.18 0.01 0.01 
q25    0.65 0.05 0.35    q25    0.84 0.82 0.38 q25    0.57 0.80 0.17  q25    0.37 0.01 0.02 
q50     0.03  0,42    q50      0.93 0.40 q50     0.83  0.04  q50     0.02  0.04 





















stud5_8         stud5_8          stud5_8      stud5_8      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.68 0.31 0.09 0.15    q10  0.63 0.86 0.84 0.54 q10  0.99 0.56 0.82 0.13  q10  0.98 0.57 0.07 0.04 
q25    0.27 0.06 0.14    q25    0.74 0.54 0.31 q25    0.46 0.81 0.11  q25    0.34 0.01 0.01 
q50     0.19  0,31    q50      0.60 0.32 q50     0.67  0.01  q50     0.02  0.02 
q75      0.94    q75        0.50 q75      0.02  q75      0.35 
                          
stud9_11        stud9_11          stud9_11      stud9_11      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.43 0.70 0.08 0.24    q10  0.90 0.11 0.04 0.02 q10  0.28 0.68 0.93 0.06  q10  0.97 0.13 0.00 0.00 
q25    0.09 0.00 0.04    q25    0.03 0.02 0.01 q25    0.52 0.43 0.20  q25    0.02 0.00 0.00 
q50     0.02  0,21    q50      0.32 0.15 q50     0.68  0.05  q50     0.00  0.01 
q75      0.53    q75        0.31 q75      0.01  q75      0.81 
         
stud12pl         stud12pl  stud12pl    stud12pl 
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.93 0.24 0.02 0.10    q10  0.75 0.30 0.14 0.04 q10  0.08 0.03 0.13 0.04  q10  0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
q25    0.08 0.01 0.05    q25    0.07 0.04 0.01 q25    0.49 0.96 0.19  q25    0.00 0.00 0.00 
q50     0.03  0,30    q50      0.46 0.09 q50     0.41  0.36  q50     0.00  0.20 
q75      0.53    q75        0.15 q75      0.13  q75      0.02 
                          
rrr         Rrr          rrr      rrr      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.98 0.83 0.37 0.60    q10  0.98 0.88 0.33 0.44 q10  0.17 0.21 0.21 0.05  q10  0.16 0.02 0.00 0.01 
q25    0.77 0.23 0.53    q25    0.84 0.29 0.40 q25    0.85 0.77 0.26  q25    0.08 0.00 0.02 
q50     0.24  0,61    q50      0.21 0.42 q50     0.84  0.17  q50     0.06  0.18 
q75      0.76    q75        0.97 q75      0.19  q75      0.87 
                          
secsec         Secsec          secsec      secsec      64  64
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.85 0.62 0.30 0.34    q10  0.93 0.61 0.93 0.97 q10  0.11 0.34 0.51 0.49  q10  0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 
q25    0.57 0.20 0.28    q25    0.14 0.25 0.87 q25    0.35 0.28 0.51  q25    0.32 0.60 0.76 
q50     0.30  0,47    q50      0.99 0.49 q50     0.61  0.91  q50     0.57  0.60 





















tertsec         Tertsec          tertsec      tertsec      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.54 0.27 0.09 0.11    q10  0.98 0.40 0.34 0.75 q10  0.10 0.36 0.59 0.61  q10  0.04 0.05 0.18 0.38 
q25    0.27 0.05 0.11    q25    0.03 0.04 0.55 q25    0.21 0.15 0.34  q25    0.91 0.58 0.41 
q50     0.23  0,37    q50      0.71 0.48 q50     0.50  0.75  q50     0.21  0.21 
q75      0.98    q75        0.27 q75      0.91  q75      0.54 
                          
techadm        Techadm          techadm      techadm      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.72 0.66 0.50 0.67    q10  0.79 0.28 0.46 0.85 q10  0.51 0.90 0.99 0.67  q10  0.91 0.56 0.53 0.91 
q25    0.23 0.19 0.85    q25    0.06 0.33 0.99 q25    0.36 0.32 0.90  q25    0.28 0.33 0.80 
q50     0.67  0,28    q50      0.46 0.23 q50     0.78  0.58  q50     0.86  0.53 
q75      0.08    q75        0.33 q75      0.37  q75      0.35 
                          
trans         Trans          trans      trans      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.69 0.40 0.31 0.49    q10  0.46 0.26 0.35 0.57 q10  0.34 0.81 0.86 0.99  q10  0.60 0.76 0.77 0.71 
q25    0.41 0.37 0.63    q25    0.28 0.51 0.94 q25    0.22 0.10 0.27  q25    0.81 0.32 0.32 
q50     0.75  0,92    q50      0.76 0.51 q50     0.36  0.69  q50     0.20  0.28 
q75      0.66    q75        0.54 q75      0.77  q75      0.82 
         
octracom         Octracom octracom    octracom 
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.78 0.98 0.86 0.38    q10  0.69 0.30 0.47 0.96 q10  0.44 0.90 0.97 0.90  q10  0.57 0.85 0.90 0.74 
q25    0.69 0.93 0.38    q25    0.13 0.43 0.59 q25    0.27 0.31 0.50  q25    0.63 0.41 0.91 
q50     0.75  0,13    q50      0.50 0.08 q50     0.87  0.97  q50     0.51  0.77 
q75      0.15    q75        0.10 q75      0.85  q75      0.35 
                          
ocservic         ocservic         ocservic      ocservic      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 65  65
q10  0.53 0.21 0.22 0.34    q10  0.44 0.11 0.20 0.54 q10  0.43 0.80 0.64 0.64  q10  0.57 0.17 0.07 0.05 
q25    0.24 0.31 0.55    q25    0.04 0.19 0.92 q25    0.06 0.07 0.12  q25    0.13 0.05 0.04 
q50     0.99  0,74    q50      0.62 0.20 q50     0.57  0.62  q50     0.25  0.16 





















Naoccup        Naoccup         Naoccup      Naoccup      
qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90    qA\qB  q25  q50  q75  q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90  qA\qB  q25 q50 q75 q90 
q10  0.60 0.39 0.32 0.58    q10  0.40 0.12 0.20 0.39 q10  0.33 0.71 0.91 0.94  q10  0.84 0.48 0.24 0.24 
q25    0.46 0.39 0.83    q25    0.07 0.22 0.67 q25    0.32 0.14 0.34  q25    0.36 0.13 0.16 
q50     0.77  0,69    q50      0.60 0.38 q50     0.32  0.69  q50     0.27  0.35 
q75      0.46    q75        0.50 q75      0.72  q75      0.88 
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4. FIGURE 1A. INCOME DISTRIBUTION  
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5. FIGURE 1A, CONTINUED  
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Figure 2A. Income distribution, tenure groups 
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6. FIGURE 2A , CONTINUED  
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Figure 3A. Income distribution, age groups 
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7. FIGURE 3A , CONTINUED  
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Figure 4A. Income distribution, educational groups 
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8. FIGURE 4A , CONTINUED  
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Figure 5A. Income distribution, union-nonunion groups 
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9. FIGURE 5A , CONTINUED  
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Figure 6A_1 Sectors (detailed) 
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Figure 6A_2. Sectors (aggregated) 
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10. FIGURE 7A. INCOME DISTRIBUTION, MARRIED-NONMARRIED GROUPS 
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11. FIGURE 7A , CONTINUED  
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Figure 8A. Income distribution, child-family vs. non-child-family groups 











































































































12. FIGURE 8A , CONTINUED  
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Figure 9A. Income distribution, gender groups 












































































































13. FIGURE 9A , CONTINUED  
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Figure 10A. Income distribution, race/ethnicity groups 
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